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THE ATTITUDES OF POLICE EXECUTIVES
TOWARD MIRANDA AND INTERROGATION
POLICIES
MARVIN ZALMAN & BRAD W. SMITH*
Top administrators of the largest American municipal police departments
were surveyed regarding interrogation law and practice. Major findings
include: (1) Most big city police administrators do not wish to overturn
Miranda; officers in their departments complied with Miranda rules.
Administrators agreed with the results of the majority opinions in both U.S.
v. Patane and Missouri v. Siebert. (2) Administrators disagreed with the
practice of deliberately evading Miranda rules known as interrogation
"outside Miranda." (3) Three-quarters of the respondents disagreed with
the proposition that aggressive psychological interrogation causes false
confessions. (4) Three-fifths of big city police administrators favored the
videotaping of interrogation sessions. (5) Disciplining officers for Miranda
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violations is uncommon. The survey indicates "wholesale" compliance
with legal rules designed to guide police interrogations. However, support
for violations is sufficient to be of concern for a legal system that espouses
the rule of law. Although some failures to comply are a result offrequent
changes in Miranda law by the Supreme Court, police agencies have an
obligation to closely monitor the actions of officers.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. FRAMEWORK OF THIS STUDY
Important issues of confessions law and police interrogation practices
are presently on the constitutional and public agendas. The Supreme
Court's recent decisions have left confessions law almost as confused today
as it was before 2000, when the Court was on the verge of overruling
Miranda v. Arizona.1 The stage is set for additional judicial refinement.2
Long-standing questions about the impact of legal rules on police
interrogation practices have become more urgent with the knowledge that a
number of police departments have taken advantage of Miranda
"loopholes" to flout some Miranda rules. Is knowledge and practice of
interrogation "outside Miranda" widespread or is it confined to its apparent
region of origin?3 Questions about the effectiveness of legal controls on
police behavior are even more pointed now that it is known that police
interrogation, with some regularity, generates false confessions that
contribute to wrongful convictions.4 Are police administrators aware of or
concerned about false confessions? Knowledge that abusive interrogation
causes some false confessions has led to calls for reform, chief among them
the videotaping of interrogations. How prevalent is the recording of
interrogations by police departments?
Answers to such questions are important to legal and criminal justice
scholars and to policy-makers, including legislators, judges, and law
' 384 U.S. 436 (1966); see George C. Thomas III, The End of the Road for Miranda v.
Arizona?: On the History and Future of Rules for Police Interrogation, 37 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1 (2000); Colloquy, Will Miranda Survive?: Dickerson v. United States: The Right to
Remain Silent, the Supreme Court, and Congress, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1165 (2000)
(Professor Paul Cassell v. Mr. Robert Litt).
2 See United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (2004); Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600
(2004); Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760 (2003); Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428
(2000). These cases and their implications for interrogation practice are discussed in the
following section.
3 Charles D. Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 109, 132-40 (1998).
4 Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-
DNA World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 891 (2004).
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5
enforcement administrators. Supreme Court rulings, of course, are
implemented by the police, and an understanding of the "law in action"
includes knowledge of police attitudes and opinions as well as descriptions
of interrogation practices. This study explores these issues concerning
interrogation practices through a survey of administrators of large police
agencies. A variety of related issues are examined, including executives'
global attitudes toward Miranda, their knowledge of and attitudes toward
evasion of Miranda rules (a practice known as interrogation "outside
Miranda"), their beliefs about links between aggressive psychological
interrogation and false confessions, their support for the electronic
recording of interrogations, and their views on legal and administrative
sanctions for abusive interrogations. This legal impact research study 6 is
designed to explore policy issues rather than to advance or test theories of
legal impact, although impact theory helps to illuminate some of our
findings.
The importance of this subject, indeed of most aspects of criminal
procedure, transcends its specific boundaries and raises fundamental
questions about the relationship of individuals and the state in our
constitutional order.7 The enormous power held by police officers over
confined suspects during routine interrogation sessions was adumbrated in
Chief Justice Earl Warren's classic Miranda opinion. 8 He initiated his
comments on the isolation, secrecy, and concomitant lack of knowledge
5 Criminal procedure scholars have supported the usefulness of social scientific research
in understanding the context in which legal rules are implemented and enforced. See, e.g.,
Susan R. Klein, Identifying and (Re)formulating Prophylactic Rules, Safe Harbors, and
Incidental Rights in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1030, 1063-78
(2001) (arguing that social science cannot establish constitutional norms but can assist the
courts in informing legal decision-making and developing rules to protect underlying rights,
but also noting that the courts do not always accurately understand or apply social science
data); Tracey L. Meares & Bernard E. Harcourt, Foreword: Transparent Adjudication and
Social Science Research in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 90 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 733 (2000) (reviewing many of the more recent empirical studies of
Miranda).
6 See Bradley C. Canon, Courts and Policy: Compliance, Implementation, and Impact, in
THE AMERICAN COURTS: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 435, 435-66 (John B. Gates & Charles A.
Johnson eds., 1991); see also discussion infra Part I.C.
7 The individual-state relationship lies at the core of politics and is the subject of a vast
political theoretic, constitutional law, and human rights literature. It should be kept in mind,
especially in empirically grounded studies of rights, that these relations occur and must be
evaluated in the context of the constitutional regime that exists in a particular time and place.
As it could take one or more volumes to specify the sociopolitical context of a study like
ours, we forego extended discussion but only call the reader's attention to such context,
which will become more salient in the conclusion to this Article.
8 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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about what transpires in the interrogation room and on the various
techniques recommended by proponents of psychological interrogation
9
with the reminder that "[t]he cases before us raise questions which go to the
roots of our concepts of American criminal jurisprudence: the restraints
society must observe consistent with the Federal Constitution in prosecuting
individuals for crime."' 0  An appreciation that the most mundane
interrogation session involves the application of state power, even at the
retail level, raises questions about whether deviations from courts' rulings
by police officers undermine the values of legality that undergird our
constitutional system. We comment on this subject in the Conclusion."
The complexities of the subject at hand and the nature of the
institutions being studied ensure that a single study will never be
comprehensive. For example, Miranda law is a composite of many rules, is
in flux, and, as a result of the Supreme Court's ideological divisions, is
somewhat self-contradictory. After four decades, compliance with Miranda
cannot be measured simply by the frequency with which the warnings are
read prior to interrogation.' 2 These factors preclude a simple causal model
in which legal rules have a direct and unidirectional effect on police
practices. Police behavior will be the result of multiple social and
administrative causes, and it is likely that some level of mutual causation is
at work. 3 In a notable example, Chief Justice Burger, appointed to the
9 Id. at 448-55.
'0 Id. at 439.
11 See discussion infra Part V.B.
12 This issue is well understood by scholars who have explored the way in which police
have applied the Supreme Court's interrogation rules. See, e.g., Richard A. Leo & Welsh S.
White, Adapting to Miranda: Modern Interrogators' Strategies for Dealing with the
Obstacles Posed by Miranda, 84 MINN. L. REV. 397 (1999) [hereinafter, Leo & White,
Adapting to Miranda].
03 This Article is a policy study rather than one that seeks to develop or test theory about
the impact of law on social behavior. Even a policy study rests on implicit theories about the
influence of law on social behavior. We assume that the influence of legal rules on police
behavior is quite complex, and that to a degree, courts are themselves influenced by the
behavior of the police. The complexity of the law and society relationship was suggested by
two great works of "realist" jurisprudence by Benjamin Cardozo and Oliver Wendell
Holmes. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921); OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 5 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., Belknap Press 1963)
(1881). Without finer quantitative data it is not possible to make firm causal statements
about the mutual influences of legal rules and social behavior. See HUBERT M. BLALOCK,
JR., CAUSAL INFERENCES IN NONEXPERIMENTAL RESEARCH 62-94 (1964). Nevertheless,
policy studies like ours can at least contribute to a better understanding of the policy
environment of legal rules.
In all policy writing and analyses, readers must be alert to misinterpretation that can arise
from ideological or partisan use of data. A blatant and even inane use of a spurious
correlation occurred when Senator John M. McClellan of Mississippi, in the debates leading
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Supreme Court by President Nixon in part to unravel the Miranda decision,
stayed his hand as it became clear that police enforced Miranda in a manner
that weakened its effectiveness. 14 While the Supreme Court's post-Miranda
decisions have been influenced in part by the Court's reactions to and
perceptions of police behavior, evidence also supports the view that when
implementing the law, the police have reacted in complex ways based on
their own perceptions of the mixed signals sent by the Court. 15 Research
into American policing is further complicated by the great diversity in size,
experience, and professionalism among the approximately twelve thousand
local law enforcement agencies in the United States. 16  Finally, law
compliance is never perfect and is influenced by a number of cultural,
situational, and administrative or structural factors. The behavior we
study-police interrogation-is far from a simple, discrete event and, as
noted, raises a number of pressing legal and policy issues. A single study
based on one survey can illuminate the subject and provide helpful policy
information but has to be triangulated with other relevant research to
provide a full understanding of the subject.
With these limitations in mind, the survey research reported in this
Article amplifies existing knowledge regarding interrogation policies,
including the link between interrogation and false confessions, and
procedures that tend to undermine the effectiveness of Miranda. It
supplements empirical studies of police interrogation published in the past
decade. 17 The survey asked attitude and fact questions. In addition to
to the passage of Title II of the Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1966, purporting to
"overrule" Miranda,
propped up in the rear of the Senate chamber a huge facsimile of the F.B.I.'s crime graph. The
titles of key Supreme Court decisions were marked at the peaks along the rising line, to show the
embarrassing parallel between Supreme Court activity on behalf of defendants and the crime
rise.
FRED P. GRAHAM, THE DUE PROCESS REVOLUTION: THE WARREN COURT'S IMPACT ON
CRIMINAL LAW 12 (1970). Senator McClellan's implicit assumption that increases in crime
rates were the result of Supreme Court decisions (and little else) was so simplistic as to
suggest that his two-variable chart was motivated more by partisan politics than the search
for scientific truth.
14 Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 304-05 (1980); see LIVA BAKER, MIANDA:
CRIME, LAW AND POLITICS 196-97 (1985).
15 Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, supra note 3, at 132-40.
16 MATTHEW J. HICKMAN & BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, LOCAL POLICE DEPARTMENTS, 2003 1 tbl.1 (2006), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.govibjs/pub/pdf/lpd03.pdf (reporting 12,656 local police departments
in the U.S. in 2003, not including state police agencies or sheriffs' departments).
17 Some of these studies are discussed infra, Part II. More policy-relevant information is
needed. A search of the National Criminal Justice Reference Service (NCJRS) website,
under "Law Enforcement-Criminal Investigation," turned up no material on interrogation
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questions on specific policy issues (such as false confessions), the survey
also asked questions about knowledge of recent developments in
confessions law and interrogation practices. Finally, we explore the drop-
off in law compliance that may result from confusing and oft-changed rules.
If following the Supreme Court's gyrations on confessions law is
challenging to practicing lawyers, it is likely to be even more so for police
administrators, given their broad responsibilities and lack of specialized
legal training. Having information regarding administrators' knowledge, as
well as their opinions, is important in the formulation of sound policy.
Section I.B presents a brief overview of aspects of confessions law
relevant to the research issues addressed in this study. Section I.C sets this
study in the context of impact research that has been conducted mainly by
political scientists. In Section II, we review prior research concerning the
policy questions addressed by the survey. Section IL.A reviews the second
wave of major empirical studies of the impact of Miranda on police
interrogation practices that were conducted since 1996. This literature
grounds our survey questions, which inquire into the general attitudes of
police officials toward Miranda. Sections II.B-II.E review the relevant
research in regard to specific policy issues that form the basis of the
remaining questions in our survey: interrogation "outside Miranda," false
confessions and psychological interrogation practices, the videotaping of
interrogations, and legal and administrative controls on police interrogation.
Section III describes our research methodology and specifies the research-
policy questions addressed by this study. Section IV presents the results of
the survey and includes policy-oriented discussions of the findings. Finally,
Section V reviews the contributions that our findings make to better
understand the policy issues presently surrounding Miranda and discusses
the meaning of the results for the rule of law.
or confessions out of 190 entries. Topic-National Criminal Justice Reference Service,
http://www.ncjrs.gov/App/Topics/MorePublications.aspx?Topicld= 166&hSortBy=&hResult
sPerPage= 0&reuse=l&page= l&lowerrangeboundary=13) (last visited May 7, 2007). A
few of the 190 items dealt with wrongful conviction and eyewitness identification
techniques. The lack of federally funded studies of interrogation may be simply fortuitous or
may instead reflect a lack of interest, the sensitive nature of interrogation issues, the
difficulty of studying the process, or a judgment that existing knowledge is a sufficient basis
for good policy-making. In contrast, Paul Cassell and Bret Hayman noted that a number of
official studies on interrogation had been sponsored by the British government. Paul G.
Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police Interrogation in the 1990s: An Empirical Study of the
Effects of Miranda, 43 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 839, 849 (1996).
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B. CONSTITUTIONAL CONFESSIONS LAW: A BRIEF OVERVIEW
Prior to Miranda, the Supreme Court constitutionalized the common
law rule that excluded involuntary confessions from trial evidence. The
voluntariness test was applied in federal cases under the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination 18 and in state cases under the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause. 19 Over the next three decades, the Court
decided a series of due process cases finding that overbearing police
practices, short of torture, violated the voluntariness test.20 The Supreme
Court was more proactive in federal cases, using its supervisory authority to
strike down confessions obtained after prolonged interrogation.2' In the
1960s, an invigorated and liberal Supreme Court incorporated the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination2 2 and ruled that an
interrogated suspect has a right to counsel under limited conditions.2 3
Within two years of those rulings, the Court, dissatisfied with the
voluntariness test, issued its arguably most famous decision, Miranda v.
24Arizona. Miranda did not outlaw police interrogation or require that
defense attorneys be present, but sought instead to tame abusive practices
by the relatively anodyne practice (in hindsight) of informing criminal
suspects that they actually have a constitutional right to remain silent in the
face of police questioning-a right that they could exercise in the context of
police interrogation. 5
18 Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 541-43 (1897).
19 Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (holding that torture violates Fourteenth
Amendment due process); see also Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
20 See, e.g., Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961) (vigorous interrogation of a
mentally defective or insane suspect violated due process); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S.
315 (1959) (confession obtained by importuning of police officer-friend violated due
process); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958) (confession obtained under threat of
releasing suspect to lynch mob violated due process); Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954)
(confession obtained by physician feigning help violated due process); Malinski v. New
York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945) (keeping suspect naked for several hours before questioning
violated due process); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944) (excessively long
interrogation without a break violated due process); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227
(1940) (moving suspect to avoid contacting family or counsel violated due process). For
contemporaneous accounts, see ALAN BARTH, LAW ENFORCEMENT VERSUS THE LAW 61-76
(1961); DAVID FELLMAN, THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS 175-85 (1958). See also WELSH S.
WHITE, MIRANDA'S WANING PROTECTIONS: POLICE INTERROGATION PRACTICES AFTER
DICKERSON (2001).
21 Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S.
332 (1943).
22 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
23 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
24 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
25 Id. at 471.
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Miranda, bitterly criticized by the political right and by most
prosecutors and police chiefs, was an important domestic issue in the 1968
presidential campaign.26 Intense dislike of Miranda led Congress to pass
Title II of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,27 a law
purporting to overrule the decision and to reinstate the voluntariness test in
federal cases. 28  The Supreme Court's lack of clarity in interpreting
Miranda for the guidance of police officers is best understood by viewing
post-Miranda law as a field of ideologically charged political conflict
between a Court divided (more or less) between conservative "crime control
model" advocates and liberal supporters of the "due process model" of
criminal justice.29 The liberal Warren Court that decided Miranda by a 5-4
margin was soon replaced by a more conservative Court.30 It is telling that
in the three decades between Brown v. Mississippi3 1 and Miranda v.
Arizona,32 more than thirty due process confessions decisions led the Court
to decide that a more clear-cut rule was needed. Yet as Justice Scalia noted
in his dissent in Dickerson v. United States, "in the 34 years since Miranda
was decided, this Court has been called upon to decide nearly 60 cases
involving a host of Miranda issues. ' 33 This fact, raised by Justice Scalia to
show that Miranda was no more "workable" than the voluntariness test,
instead indicates that a conservative Court, unable or unwilling to kill off
Miranda, has inconsistently applied its holding in the four decades since its
promulgation.34
The Court's ideological division produced a set of rules that upheld but
watered down Miranda protections. For example, police are not required to
clarify a suspect's inarticulate question about obtaining counsel if it is not
26 BAKER, supra note 14, at 232-60.
27 Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (1968); see RICHARD HARRIS, THE FEAR OF CRIME
(1968).
28 See Yale Kamisar, Foreword: From Miranda to § 3501 to Dickerson to... 99 MICH.
L. REV. 879, 879-80 (2001).
29 HERBERT PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 147-256 (1968).
30 BAKER, supra note 14, at 272.
"' 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
32 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
33 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 463 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis
in original).
34 More complex and more charitable interpretations are provided by Klein, supra note 5
(in addition to basic constitutional rights, the Supreme Court has of necessity created a
variety of ancillary criminal procedure rules that may be categorized as prophylactic, safe
harbor, and incidental right rules), and by Jeffrey Standen, The Politics of Miranda, 12
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 555 (2003) (the Supreme Court's seemingly ad hoc Miranda
jurisprudence is "political" in the Platonic sense of superior statesmen carefully crafting
precise decisions to fit specific cases rather than general law).
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an explicit request for a lawyer; 35 questioning by a probation officer bent on
obtaining an incriminating statement and turning it over to the police does
not require a Miranda warning;36 a suspect who has claimed the right to
silence may be re-interrogated under certain conditions despite Miranda's
categorical prohibition;3 and misleading warnings have all been upheld. 8
These and other cases are straightforward attempts to interpret Miranda so
as to weaken its legal controls on police interrogation.
39
In another set of cases, the Court injected an intriguing anomaly into
confessions law that brought Miranda to the brink of extinction and opened
the door to police practices that undermined Miranda in practice. 40 These
cases declared that the Miranda warnings were not in themselves
constitutional rights but rather prophylactic devices designed to protect the
underlying privilege against self-incrimination. As a result, the Court
created three categories of collateral use of improperly obtained statements
and one clear exception to the Miranda rule.
In these cases, Miranda was violated either by not giving warnings, by
reading defective warnings, or by ignoring a suspect's invocation of rights.
The first collateral use, impeachment, allows illegally obtained statements
to be read to a jury where a suspect took the stand and testified in
contradiction to a statement made during interrogation; the statement is
admitted to impeach the suspect's veracity and not to prove guilt.4 1 The
Court so ruled even though it does not allow statements obtained in direct
violation of the Due Process or Self-Incrimination Clauses to be used for
42impeachment. In the second collateral use, derivative "leads," even
though statements resulting from Miranda-violated interrogations are not
admissible in court, information derived from the statements could be used
35 Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994); see also Kenworthey Bilz, The Fall of the
Confession Era, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 367 (2005) (reviewing LAWRENCE M. SOLAN
& PETER M. TIERSMA, SPEAKING OF CRIME: THE LANGUAGE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2005)).
36 Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 426-40 (1984).
37 Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 100-07 (1975).
38 Duckworth v. Egan, 492 U.S. 195 (1989). For an example of how the confusion
between the Fifth Amendment right to counsel established by Miranda and the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel can leave an indigent suspect without any lawyer at a critical
stage, with tragic results, see ROGER PARLOFF, TRIPLE JEOPARDY 32-34 (1996).
39 Leo & White, Adapting to Miranda, supra note 12, at 414-33.
40 Professor Stephen Schulhofer denotes this as 'Tifth Amendment exceptionalism."
Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda, Dickerson, and the Puzzling Persistence of Fifth
Amendment Exceptionalism, 99 MICH. L. REv. 941 (2001).
41 Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
42 New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 450 (1979) (self-incrimination); Mincey v.
Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 398 (1978) (due process).
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by the police as leads to further incriminating evidence. 43  The rule
excluding such derivative evidence in search and seizure law, the "fruits of
the poisonous tree" doctrine, was held not to apply to Miranda violations.
The third form of collateral use, cured statements, occurs when a suspect
incriminates himself after questioning not preceded by Miranda warnings
and then makes a second confession after warnings are properly
administered in a subsequent interrogation. The first, unwarned admission
44is inadmissible, but the post-Miranda confession is admissible. Finally, a
public safety exception was created, admitting statements made in answer to
unwarned police questions when the questions concerned immediate threats
to public safety. 5 The exception was based on the reasoning that Miranda
is not a constitutional rule.46
These doctrinally confusing cases led legal scholars to develop a
number of theories to explain the confusion created. Liberal defenders of
Miranda thought that the Court was preparing to overrule the case.4 7 Some
conservative scholars questioned these rulings as inapposite in that the
Court has no jurisdiction to impose a non-constitutional rule on the states.4a
Nevertheless, the Court continued to support the basic Miranda rules.4 9
Such doctrinal gyrations have become a minefield for police officers who
wish to fairly apply the law.
The prophylactic cases threatened the constitutional legitimacy of
Miranda, but a collision was slow in coming. Finally, in 2000, the Supreme
Court was confronted with a Court of Appeals decision holding that under
18 U. S.C. § 3501, an otherwise voluntary confession (under the due process
voluntariness test) was admissible in a trial even though Miranda warnings
had not been read.50  The lower court ruled that Miranda was not a
constitutional decision "and that therefore Congress could by statute have
43 Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 450-52 (1974).
44 Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 307-09, 318 (1985); see Kirsten Lela Ambach, Notes
& Comments: Miranda's Poisoned Fruit Tree: The Admissibility of Physical Evidence
Derived from an Unwarned Statement, 78 WASH. L. REv. 757, 768 (2003) (coining the term
"cured statement exception").
45 New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984).
46 Id. at 657.
47 See, e.g., Susan R. Klein, Miranda Deconstitutionalized: When the Self-Incrimination
Clause and the Civil Rights Act Collide, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 417, 419, 428, 433-34 passim
(1994).
48 JOSEPH D. GRANO, CONFESSIONS, TRUTH, AND THE LAW 183-98 (1993).
49 See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000); Davis v. United States, 512
U.S. 452 (1994); Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990); Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496
U.S. 582 (1990).
50 Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 432.
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the final say on the question of admissibility., 51 In a surprising about-face,
Chief Justice Rehnquist, an architect of the prophylactic theory, held that
Miranda is "a constitutional decision of this Court" and "may not be in
effect overruled by an Act of Congress. 52 Although the Court in Dickerson
"saved" the Miranda rule, it did not touch the exceptions, leaving the
possibility that Miranda would be alive but neutered.53 In doing so, the
Court seems to have created a unique Fifth Amendment niche that can be
viewed either as constitutionally unstable or as having "manufacture[d]
immunity from criticism on legal grounds. 4  Three Supreme Court
decisions following Dickerson paint a more nuanced picture.
Chavez v. Martinez55 was a civil case in which a person subjected to
abusive interrogation sought damages for injuries to his civil rights.
Leaving aside the reasoning of its fractured decision, a plurality of the
Supreme Court held that the Fifth Amendment is an exclusionary rule and
that "core" violations occur only when coerced statements are entered into
evidence, not when the coercion occurs.56  Chavez was important as a
practical matter because it undermined the Ninth Circuit's ruling (described
below) that allowed civil suits for injuries resulting from interrogation
"outside Miranda.57  The effect of Chavez was to eliminate a strong
sanction against police departments that were deliberately flouting Miranda
rules.58
Chavez was followed by two decisions in 2004 that split on the
collateral use of statements obtained after Miranda violations. United
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 A symposium issue of the Michigan Law Review was devoted to attempting to unravel
the meaning of Dickerson. Symposium, Miranda After Dickerson: The Future of Confession
Law, 99 MICH. L. REv. 879-1247 (2001).
54 Standen, supra note 34, at 567.
15 538 U.S. 760 (2003).
56 Id. at 770; see United States v. Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d 168, 181-82, 187
(S.D.N.Y. 2001); Marvin Zalman, The Coming Paradigm Shift on Miranda: The Impact of
Chavez v. Martinez, 39 CRIM. L. BULL. 334 (2003) [hereinafter Zalman, Paradigm Shift];
Marvin Zalman, Reading the Tea Leaves of Chavez v. Martinez: The Future of Miranda, 40
CRIM. L. BULL. 299 (2004) [hereinafter Zalman, Tea Leaves].
57 Cal. Attorneys for Criminal Justice v. Butts, 195 F.3d 1039, 1050 (9th Cir. 1999).
58 The basis of a civil action against the police was not supported by the other circuits
and is problematic if the privilege is viewed as an exclusionary rule, although three Justices
deemed the Self-Incrimination Clause the basis of a cause of action for the infliction of
"severe compulsion or extraordinary pressure" in order to gain a confession. 538 U.S. at 789
(Kennedy, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens and Ginsburg, JJ.). In any event, a majority in
Chavez ruled that a violation of due process may be the basis of a cause of action. See
Zalman, Tea Leaves, supra note 56, at 318-19.
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States v. Patane59 allowed a gun into evidence that came to the attention of
an officer through brief questioning preceded by incomplete Miranda
warnings. This decision confirmed the derivative "leads" collateral use
exception of Michigan v. Tucker.60 In Missouri v. Seibert,61 to the contrary,
the Court distinguished Oregon v. Elstad,62 in which a Mirandized
confession was held admissible under the cured statements exception after
police had obtained an earlier admission without administering any
warnings. Unlike Elstad, where the failure to administer warnings during
the first questioning appeared to be inadvertent, the failure to read warnings
in Seibert was part of a deliberate and carefully orchestrated two-step
procedure. A woman, suspected of being involved in the arson of her
mobile home by her teenaged son that led to the death of an occupant, was
brought to a police station from the hospital where her son was recuperating
at about 3:00 a.m. 63 The arresting officer was instructed not to read the
Miranda warnings. 64 The interrogating officer questioned the unwarned
Ms. Seibert for about a half-hour, using leading statements that indicated
that she was involved in the arson with the intent of killing the youth.65
After she made an admission, the officer allowed a fifteen minute break.66
Thereafter, an interrogation session preceded by Miranda warnings began,
and the officer confronted Ms. Seibert with her incriminating statements
made in the previous session.6 7 This mode of interrogation was taught to
officers as an appropriate procedure by a proprietary training business.68
By striking down the confession obtained by the "Missouri two-step" in
Seibert, the Court has kept Miranda alive as a functioning rule that allows
69
some meaningful judicial control over police interrogation practices.
'9 542 U.S. 630 (2004).
60 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
61 542 U.S. 600 (2004).
62 470 U.S. 298, 313 (1985).
63 Seibert, 542 U.S. at 604-05.
64 id.
65 Id. at 605.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 609-11. Justice Souter's opinion referred to the Police Law Institute, a
proprietary school that provides training and instructional materials for police in Florida,
Illinois, Missouri, and Ohio. The Police Law Institute, http://www.policelawinstitute.org/
plims/ (last visited May 7, 2007). Their police training businesses include Wicklander-
Zulawski & Associates, http://www.w-z.com/ (last visited May 7, 2007), and John E. Reid &
Associates, http://www.reid.com/training-programs/r.training.html (last visited May 7,
2007).
69 Seibert, 542 U.S. at 617 (confession obtained by a "question-first tactic" conducted by
"[s]trategists dedicated to draining the substance out of Miranda" that "threatens to thwart
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Whether this support of the Miranda rule will continue or whether it will be
reduced only to an exhortatory exercise depends on Supreme Court
decisions in the wake of Seibert.
C. IMPACT AND COMPLIANCE RESEARCH
Professor Richard Leo began his empirical study of interrogation by
referring to the "'gap problem'-the gap between how law is written in the
books and how it is actually practiced by legal actors in the social world., 70
This abiding concern of legal realism and one of its successors, law and
society scholarship, ought to be an important element in the calculations
that are used in legal decision-making; one would think that legal impact
studies would be common and that judges would use such knowledge in
their decisions. In fact, however, the link between the empirical knowledge
generated by legal impact studies and judicial decision-making is tenuous.
This is in part because the effects of governmental policy-making or law-
making cannot be known with the same precision as the effects, e.g., of
modem medicines or engineering. In these more scientific endeavors,
research and practice are tightly linked.7  Public issues and even legal
decisions may be driven by odd mixtures of knowledge, calculation,
imagery, emotion, ideology, personality, and fortuitous events.7 2
In the appellate judicial sphere, "facts" are constructs that have been
filtered through a trial process and can produce suspiciously altered
realities. 73 Nevertheless, when the Supreme Court makes decisions, the
Justices are surely aware of some likely effects of their decisions on society.
However, this process is often a matter of guesswork in a sea of ambiguity.
Justice Souter acknowledged as much in Missouri v. Seibert when he
Miranda's purpose of reducing the risk that a coerced confession would be admitted," held
inadmissible).
70 Richard Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, 86. J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 266, 266
(1996) [hereinafter Leo, Interrogation Room].
7 1 This is not to disvalue the importance of policy analysis but only to assert that the role
of empiricism in law and government is radically different than in scientific and
technological endeavors, which are defined by and impossible in the absence of scientific
theory and empirical research. "Policy analysis is as much an art and a craft as a science."
DAVID L. WEIMER & AIDAN R. VINING, POLICY ANALYSIS: CONCEPTS AND PRACTICE,
FOURTH EDITION 37 (2005).
72 A nation, after all, can take momentous action, such as shifting the wealth of different
groups via economic legislation or going to war, based on confused, conflicting, and even
flatly erroneous information. See WALTER LIPPMANN, PUBLIC OPINION 11-13 (Free Press,
1997) (1922).
73 JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 14-36
(1950); George C. Thomas, III, Stories About Miranda, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1959, 1991-93
(2004).
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opined that the Court had no statistics on the frequency of the Miranda-
avoidance practices encountered in that case.74  This lack of empirical
knowledge did not stay the Court's decision, nor could it in this and other
cases if the law is to function at all. Legal decision-making proceeds
incrementally, one case at a time, and the empiricism that counts is the
"facts" of the case, as interpreted by the deciding court.75
Despite the rough reality of legal policy-making, it remains important
to attempt to gauge the impact of legal decisions, especially Supreme Court
decisions, on society. "Impact research" is, therefore, an essential
component of political science/judicial process scholarship, even if its
"golden age" (1960-1975) has passed.76 The impact of legal decisions
involves four populations: the decision-maker (the court); the interpreting
population (lower court judges, attorneys, legal scholars, and police legal
advisors); the implementing population (police supervisors and officers);
and the consumer population (suspects).7 7 Impact studies of the Miranda
doctrine have focused on the relationship between the Supreme Court and
the police and have tended to be atheoretical. 78 A number of terms identify
the breadth of this kind of research. The total effect of a Supreme Court's
decision on society is such a broad concept as to complicate empirical
study. Impact is taken to reflect the broad but measurable effects of
decisions, while compliance implies a narrow focus on the extent to which a
decision is followed or evaded by interpreting or implementing
populations.7 9
Compliance involves two categories of responses by implementers: an
acceptance decision, which is "the actor's psychological reaction to the
decision," and a behavior response, or "what an actor actually does in
response to a decision." 80 To the extent that a broad survey cannot plumb
the depth of a respondent's feelings, conclusions about support for Miranda
74 Seibert, 542 U.S. at 609.
75 See EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 8-27 (1949). Standen
asserts that the Miranda Court made empirical or predictive errors in believing that attorneys
would be made part of the interrogation process, and that the "Court may also have made
empirical mistakes in some of its post-Miranda cases." Standen, supra note 34, at 565.
76 Canon, supra note 6, at 435. Canon discusses the first generation of Miranda studies
in his essay. Id. The new wave of empirical studies, which began in 1996, is a significant
chapter in court decision impact research, although it is less concerned with generating and
testing political science theories and more focused on an atheoretical elucidation of the
process. Id.
17 Id. at 437.
78 Id. at 456.
79 Id. at 438-40; STEPHEN L. WASBY, THE IMPACT OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT: SOME PERSPECTIVES 27-42 (1970) [hereinafter WASBY, IMPACT].
80 Canon, supra note 6, at 438.
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ought to be triangulated with interview studies, such as the study conducted
by Wasby in which small-town police and other officials were interviewed
to gauge their receptiveness to recent Supreme Court criminal procedure
81decisions. Similarly, observational studies of interrogation offer a
baseline for comparison with the survey results.
At least four overlapping, mid-level theories have been advanced to
explain the causal mechanisms involved in compliance with or avoidance of
court decisions.83 Very few studies have applied utility theory, which
explains compliance in terms of weighing the material and psychological
costs and benefits of compliance.84 Likewise, few studies have applied
legitimacy theory, where a key explanatory variable in compliance is the
degree to which the implementer believes the court's authority to render its
decision is supported by the society's "political structure." 85
Communications theories attempt to relate compliance to the clarity of the
Court's decision and the extent to which implementers know abut the
decision.86  Organizational theories explore the relationships between
compliance and the organizational goals of institutional implementers.
These include analyses of organizational tension and inertia as compliance
factors.87
This study is primarily concerned with policy questions rather than
with impact theory. It is an impact study, however, in that it measures
knowledge of legal cases, acceptance of Miranda and recent confessions
decisions, and compliance with Miranda in the respondents' agencies. This
study also explores policy issues that go beyond the specific question of
compliance with Supreme Court decisions. The policy issue of false
confessions, for example, involves legislation, administrative regulations,
and state court decisions, such as those relating to videotaping
interrogations. Were the primary goal of this Article theory testing,
81 STEPHEN L. WASBY, SMALL TOWN POLICE AND THE SUPREME COURT: HEARING THE
WORD (1976) [hereinafter WASBY, SMALL TOWN POLICE].
82 Cassell & Hayman, supra note 17; Leo, Interrogation Room, supra note 70.
83 Canon, supra note 6, at 440-44.
84 See, e.g., Don W. Brown & Robert V. Stover, Understanding Compliance and
Noncompliance With the Law: The Contributions of Utility Theory, 56 Soc. Sci. Q. 363
(1975).
85 See, e.g., THOMAS CARLYLE DALTON, THE STATE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL AND
CONGRESSIONAL REFORM (1985).
86 See, e.g., Stephen Wasby, The Communication of the Supreme Court's Criminal
Procedure Decisions: A Preliminary Mapping, 18 VILL. L. REv. 1086 (1973).
87 See, e.g., Lawrence Baum, Implementation of Judicial Decisions: An Organizational
Analysis, 4 AM. POL. Q. 86 (1976); Charles A. Johnson, Judicial Decisions and
Organizational Change, 14 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 27 (1979).
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however, questions would focus more on knowledge of decisions and the
states of mind of the respondents. Further, the use of mailed surveys alone
may not generate the kind of data required to sustain a meaningful
theoretical study. As noted in the introduction, Miranda doctrine has grown
so complex and has been part of policing for such a long time that a
theoretical study of Miranda's impact should include its broad impact and
the spiral of mutual influences between the police and the Court. The oft-
repeated quotation in Dickerson, that "Miranda has become embedded in
routine police practice to the point where the warnings have become part of
our national culture,, 88 is a notable example of the broad influence of a case
returning to influence a subsequent judicial decision. In sum, this study,
although not designed to generate or test legal impact theory, is
strengthened by considering the theoretical implications of impact studies,
and in turn provides data that may be useful in advancing impact and
compliance theories.
II. PRIOR RESEARCH AND POLICY ISSUES
This section briefly explains the origin of the present study as an
extension of recent survey research and describes five issues concerning the
intersection of policing and confessions law. These issues are: knowledge
held by the police about recent developments in Miranda law; interrogation
"outside Miranda"; the role of police interrogation in generating false
confessions; videotaping interrogations; and legal and administrative
controls on interrogation practices.
A. REACTIONS TO MIRANDA: RECENT RESEARCH
From the time of the Miranda decision, empirical studies have focused
on compliance and attitudes toward the decision. Richard Leo's
summarization of twelve "first generation" empirical studies of Miranda
conducted between 1966 and 1973 led to five broad conclusions. 89 These
studies demonstrated that (1) the immediate reaction to Miranda among
varying police departments was inconsistent, but that soon all police
departments complied with the letter of the Miranda warnings; (2) suspects
frequently waived their Miranda rights; (3) once suspects waived, the
police psychological interrogation methods criticized in Miranda continued
to be employed; (4) suspects continued to confess and make incriminating
88 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000).
89 Richard Leo, Questioning the Relevance of Miranda in the Twenty-First Century, 99
MICH. L. REV. 1000 (2001) [hereinafter, Leo, Questioning the Relevance].
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statements during police interrogation; and (5) clearance and conviction
rates were not adversely affected.90
After a two-decade hiatus, another round of Miranda studies was
published. Leo divides them into quantitative studies of the impact of
Miranda on confession and conviction rates and "those that qualitatively
seek to assess Miranda's real world impact on how police issue warnings
and elicit waivers, whether and how they comply with or circumvent
Miranda's requirements, and Miranda's effects on police interrogation
methods and confessions." 91  This qualitative research includes two
important observational studies of interrogations in four police
departments.92 Studies of interrogation session transcripts have explored
how police adapted to Miranda93 and the dynamics of false confessions.
94
An additional, policy-oriented study by Charles Weisselberg surveyed
prosecutors' offices and police training institutions in California to
understand better the dynamics of interrogation "outside Miranda.95
Reviewing these sources, Leo concludes:
First, police appear to issue and document Miranda warnings in virtually all cases.
Second, police appear to have successfully "adapted" to the Miranda requirements.
Thus, in practice, police have developed strategies that are intended to induce
Miranda waivers. Third, police appear to elicit waivers from suspects in roughly 80%
of their interrogations, though suspects with criminal records appear
disproportionately likely to invoke their rights and terminate interrogation. Fourth, in
some jurisdictions, police are systematically trained to violate Miranda by questioning
"outside Miranda" (i.e., by continuing to question suspects who have invoked the
right to counsel or the right to remain silent). Finally, some researchers have argued
that Miranda eradicated the last vestiges of third degree interrogation present in the
mid-1960s, increased the level of professionalism among interrogators, and raised
public awareness of constitutional rights.
96
A study of 211 randomly selected, published appellate cases by
George Thomas confirms that police routinely give warnings, that suspects
routinely waive their rights, and that police rarely use coercive tactics to get
90 Id. at 1001-05.
9' Id. at 1006.
92 Leo, Interrogation Room, supra note 70; Cassell & Hayman, supra note 17.
93 Leo & White, Adapting to Miranda, supra note 12, at 433-50.
94 Richard J. Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely: Rational Choice
and Irrational Action, 74 DENY. U. L. REv. 979 (1997) [hereinafter Ofshe & Leo, The
Decision to Confess Falsely].
95 Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, supra note 3, at 132-40; Charles D. Weisselberg, In the
Stationhouse after Dickerson, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1121, 1128-53 (2001) [hereinafter
Weisselberg, In the Stationhouse].
96 Leo, Questioning the Relevance, supra note 89, at 1009-10 (footnotes omitted).
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waivers or to obtain confessions after a waiver is given.97 Acknowledging
that "facts" found in an appellate case can be a distortion of what happened
in the stationhouse, Thomas gives one example from his sample where what
was likely a coercive interrogation was whitewashed by the Florida
Supreme Court.98  As for interrogation "outside Miranda," Thomas
discovered six cases in which the police ignored the invocation of rights
and the courts suppressed the statements and five in which questioning
ceased.99
Thomas appears to miss the implications of this disturbing finding.
Thomas's sample of appellate cases found that exceptions and collateral
uses where Miranda is violated are few in number: six cases in which the
public safety exception was applied, two cases in which the Harris v. New
Yorkl °° impeachment rule was allowed, and three cases in which the
Oregon v. Elstad'0 situation, a "cured" statement, was allowed.10 2 Because
these cases represented about 5% of his sample, Thomas concluded that
these exceptions are not very significant. This interpretation is subject to
several qualifications. The small percentage of cases in his sample, even if
they reflect the universe of Miranda appeals, still translates into a large
number of cases in which these collateral uses apply. Furthermore, these
few cases suggest that in half the cases in which police have the opportunity
to interrogate "outside Miranda," they take it. Finally, the facts in Missouri
v. Seibert demonstrate that proprietary police training establishments
continue to promote methods that skirt the edges of Miranda
aggressively. 10 3 Thus, the collateral use of statements that violate Miranda
is indeed a significant issue.
According to Thomas, this research, when combined with the few
studies on interrogation "outside Miranda," false confessions, and
videotaping of interrogation (discussed in subsequent sections), provides
"somewhat sketchy, evidence... that the police have adapted very well to
the Miranda regime."' 4  Even if these recent studies provide a fair
approximation of how interrogation is typically conducted in most police
departments, it would be foolish to suggest that they capture the entire
97 Thomas, III, supra note 73, at 1963.
98 Id. at 1991-93.
99 Id. at 1973-74.
'0 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
'o' 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
102 Thomas, II, supra note 73, at 1974-74, 1995-97.
103 Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 604-05 (2004).
104 Thomas, III, supra note 73, at 1961.
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reality, given the enormous fragmentation of criminal justice in America. 1 05
As Thomas notes, the major observational studies pinpointed practices in
only four police departments in two localities in the United States, while his
study of reported appellate court decisions provides a broad but possibly
skewed sample. 0 6 Further, false confessions case studies
10 7 and surveys 10 8
demonstrate that something has gone seriously awry in a small proportion
of cases. The Miranda studies conducted to date, including this survey, are
instruments too blunt to ascertain the prevalence of significant but relatively
rare events. The established existence of false confessions as a recurring
reality, however, compels ethical leaders in criminal justice to explore this
issue further.' 0 9  These considerations lead us to assert that additional
research probing the policy dimensions of Miranda law and interrogation
practices are necessary. To this end, we have developed a survey based in
part on one developed by Victoria Time and Brian Payne. 110
Shortly after the decision in Dickerson v. United States,"' Leo
prematurely proclaimed the "end of history" for Miranda impact
scholarship."12 As noted in the previous section, Dickerson settled very
little, and more recent cases have opened constitutional confessions law to
further interpretation. Taking advantage of the impending decision in
Dickerson as an opportunity for a natural experiment, Time and Payne
explored the knowledge and attitudes of police chiefs about Miranda law
and the practices of their agencies. They mailed a survey in the spring of
2000 to 182 police chiefs in Virginia, exploring their support for and
105 FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE HABITS OF LEGALITY: CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF
LAW 58-60 (1996).
106 Thomas, III, supra note 73, at 1963. The two observational studies referred to are
Cassell & Hayman, supra note 17, and Leo, Interrogation Room, supra note 70.
107 E.g., JOAN A. BARTHEL, A DEATH IN CANAAN (1976); additional case studies are listed
infra note 137.
108 E.g., Drizin & Leo, supra note 4; Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The
Consequences of False Confessions: Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in
the Age of Psychological Interrogation, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429 (1998)
[hereinafter Leo & Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions].
109 For a commentary that suggests that knowledge of false confessions should force
rethinking of the constitutional basis of confessions law, see Samuel C. Rickless,
Commentary: Miranda, Dickerson and the Problem of Actual Innocence, 19 CRIM. JUST.
ETHICS 53 (2000).
110 Brian K. Payne & Victoria M. Time, Support for Miranda among Police Chiefs: A
Qualitative Examination, 25 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 65 (2000) [hereinafter Payne & Time,
Support for Miranda]; Victoria M. Time & Brian K. Payne, Police Chiefs'Perceptions about
Miranda: An Analysis of Survey Data, 30 J. CRIM. JUST. 77 (2002) (our survey is modeled on
the one developed in this study) [hereinafter, Time & Payne, Chiefs 'Perceptions].
... 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
112 Leo, Questioning the Relevance, supra note 89, at 1010.
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perceptions of Miranda. The instrument consisted of fixed-choice and
open-ended questions and was returned by ninety-seven chiefs (55%
response rate), with seventy-five completing the open-ended questions
(42.6% response rate)." 3 In their first published article, Time and Payne
examined the responses to the open-ended questions. Forty police chiefs of
the seventy-five who responded to the open-ended questions
"recommended keeping Miranda the same"; fourteen chiefs recommended
abolishing the Miranda rule; nine noted ambiguity with the rule; and
sixteen recommended narrowing the rule.1 4 An interesting observation was
that Miranda supporters were older and less well-educated than police
chiefs who wished to abolish or modify the rule." 5
In a subsequent publication evaluating fixed-choice questions, Virginia
police chiefs generally accepted Miranda. 116 They "agreed" and "strongly
agreed" with the fact that officers routinely read Miranda warnings (94.8%
of those responding) and that officers received sufficient training to protect
offenders' Miranda rights (91.6%), but they did not believe that the
warnings made it difficult to do their jobs (64.2%). "' The Virginia chiefs
indicated that Miranda warnings did not prevent "criminals" from
confessing voluntarily (88.5%), although about half somewhat
paradoxically believed that Miranda warnings hindered voluntary
confessions (52.6%). 1 18 In accord with the qualitative results of the earlier
study,' 19 the analysis of the survey results indicated that "younger chiefs
were... more likely to agree that Miranda hinders voluntary
confessions."'' 20 Chiefs who did not have college degrees and chiefs of
smaller departments were more likely to agree that arresting officers must
read offenders their rights in order to avoid dismissal of the case. 12' These
findings suggest that chiefs who are more likely to have a sophisticated
understanding of legal doctrines have a greater appreciation of the often
contingent nature of law. An alternate interpretation is that younger and
better educated chiefs may be more conservative than older and less
educated chiefs.
113 Payne & Time, Support for Miranda, supra note 110; Time & Payne, Chiefs'
Perceptions, supra note 110.
114 Payne & Time, Support for Miranda, supra note 110, at 67-68, 71-72.
115 Id.
116 Time & Payne, Chiefs' Perceptions, supra note 110.
117 Id. at 81 (questions 2, 3 and 12).
118 Id. (questions 13 and 16).
119 Payne & Time, Support for Miranda, supra note 110.
120 Time & Payne, Chiefs'Perceptions, supra note 110, at 82.
121 id.
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The Time and Payne quantitative study provides an approach that is
useful to elicit policy-oriented information concerning interrogation in a
national sample, and provides a baseline of findings against which later
studies can be measured. We modeled our survey in part on their
instrument, replicating several questions for the sake of comparison. In
addition, we fashioned questions about knowledge of Chavez,12 2 which was
decided in the year before our survey was administered, and about attitudes
toward the decisions in Patane123 and Seibert,'24 which were decided almost
contemporaneously with the survey. Attitudes of police officials toward
these decisions are useful markers of the acceptance of the Supreme Court's
decisions, an important aspect of success in implementing law.
B. INTERROGATION "OUTSIDE MIRANDA"
Professor Paul Cassell and Bret Hayman's observational study in Salt
Lake City found no evidence of police deliberately flouting Miranda to
obtain impeaching statements, thus weakening the argument of "prestigious
academic commentators" who speculated that post-Miranda cases opened
the door to such practices. 125 Yet, two years later, a study discovered that
such a practice occurred with some regularity in California police
departments and that legal trainers advised police to strategically ignore the
invocation of silence or counsel on the grounds that the Supreme Court had
dissolved the constitutional stature of Miranda warnings. 126  Case law
shows that such practices were not confined to California. 127 As for the
frequency of the practice, Leo's observational study of three Bay Area
police departments reported that such behavior occurred in seven cases (4%
of the cases observed and 18% of the cases in which the suspect invoked
constitutional rights). 1
28
Subsequent to Weisselberg's 1998 article, 129 in California Attorneys
for Criminal Justice v. Butts,1 30 the Ninth Circuit ruled that the deliberate
flouting of Miranda-interrogation "outside Miranda"-made police
officers civilly liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This ruling, when combined
122 Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760 (2003).
123 542 U.S. 630 (2004).
124 542 U.S. 600 (2004).
125 Cassell & Hayman, supra note 17, at 861.
126 Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, supra note 3, at 133-36.
127 Id. at 132-40, 160-62, 189-92.
128 Leo, Interrogation Room, supra note 70, at 276.
129 Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, supra note 3.
130 Cal. Attorneys for Criminal Justice v. Butts, 195 F.3d 1039, 1045-50 (9th Cir. 1999).
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with the Supreme Court holding that Miranda is a constitutional rule,131
appeared to undermine interrogation "outside Miranda." In a follow-up
study of the impact of the risk of lawsuits, Weisselberg found that the
California District Attorneys Association and the California Peace Officers'
Association had discouraged the practice, 132 and that police training
materials in California withdrew support for interrogation "outside
Miranda" with varying degrees of intensity in different departments.'
33
Weisselberg concluded that the threat of litigation discouraged the
deliberate violation of Miranda rules, but he was unsure whether
interrogation "outside Miranda" would actually cease. 134 More recently,
however, the Supreme Court undermined the Ninth Circuit precedent of
California Attorneys 135 in Chavez v. Martinez.136  Chavez appears to
eliminate civil liability for flouting Miranda, making interrogation "outside
Miranda" a continuing policy concern.
C. FALSE CONFESSIONS AND PSYCHOLOGICAL INTERROGATION
PRACTICES
The "DNA revolution" in criminal investigation has raised public
concern about wrongful convictions and false confessions. The 340
"official exonerations" and the approximately 300 "mass exonerations"
identified between 1989 and 2003 may be the tip of an iceberg of several
thousand wrongful convictions each year.' 37  A review of wrongful
conviction research shows that false confessions have occurred in 14% to
25% of the cases in these studies. 138 Numerous case studies have elucidated
the process by which cntirely innocent persons confess to crimes they have
not committed.139 American and British studies have dissected the methods
131 See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 438 (2000).
132 Weisselberg, In the Stationhouse, supra note 95, at 1142-43.
133 Id. at 1143-54.
114 Id. at 1162.
135 195 F.3d 1039.
136 538 U.S. 760 (2003).
137 Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States: 1989 Through 2003, 95 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 531-40 (2005); Robert J. Ramsey & James Frank, Wrongful
Conviction: Perspectives of Criminal Justice Professionals Regarding the Frequency of
Wrongful Conviction and the Extent of System Errors, in CRIME & DELINQUENCY
(forthcoming 2007); Marvin Zalman, Brad Smith & Angie Kazaleh Kiger, Officials'
Estimates of the Incidence of "Actual Innocence " Convictions, JUST. Q. (forthcoming 2008).
138 Drizin & Leo, supra note 4, at 906.
139 See BARTHEL, supra note 107; EDWIN M. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT:
SIXTY-FIVE ACTUAL ERRORS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1932); GERRY CONLON, IN THE NAME OF
THE FATHER (Plume 1993) (1990); MARGARET EDDS, AN EXPENDABLE MAN: THE NEAR-
EXECUTION OF EARL WASHINGTON JR. (2003); JIM FISHER, FALL GUYS: FALSE CONFESSIONS
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by which false confessions are obtained.140 Two recent studies, applying
conservative measures, have identified up to 125 proven false
confessions.141  Rob Warden, the Executive Director of the Center on
Wrongful Convictions at Northwestern University School of Law,
identified false confessions as a significant factor in eleven out of eighteen
recent Illinois exonerations in capital cases. 142  The legality of police
deception during interrogation is being questioned. 43  Several of these
studies point to excesses in "psychological" interrogations and reliance on
the "Reid technique," under which a large number of police investigators
have been trained, as partly responsible for false confessions. 144  Our
research explores these issues.
D. REFORMING INTERROGATION PRACTICES: SPOTLIGHT ON
VIDEOTAPING
The concern with false confessions has generated reform proposals, the
most prominent of which is the videotaping of interrogation sessions.
141
AND THE POLITICS OF MURDER (1996); WILLARD J. LASSERS, SCAPEGOAT JUSTICE: LLOYD
MILLER AND THE FAILURE OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM (1973); MARA LEVERITT,
DEVIL'S KNOT: THE TRUE STORY OF THE WEST MEMPHIS THREE (2002); PAUL MONES,
STALKING JUSTICE (1995); SELWYN RAAB, JUSTICE IN THE BACKROOM (1967); MICHAEL L.
RADELET, HUGO ADAM BEDAU & CONSTANCE E. PUTNAM, IN SPITE OF INNOCENCE:
ERRONEOUS CONVICTIONS IN CAPITAL CASES (1992); LAWRENCE WRIGHT, REMEMBERING
SATAN (1994).
140 See GISLI GUDJONSSON, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS: A
HANDBOOK (2003); Ofshe & Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely, supra note 94.
14 1 Drizin and Leo, supra note 4, at 929-30 (noting 125 proven false confessions); see
also Leo & Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confession, supra note 108, at 444-49
(reporting 60 proven, highly probable, and probable false confessions). Leo & Ofshe's
results were challenged in part by then Professor (now judge) Paul Cassell. The Guilty and
the "Innocent": An Examination of Alleged Cases of Wrongful Conviction from False
Confessions, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 523 (1999). Although Cassell's tendentiousness
has tended to cloud the accuracy of his scholarship, see, e.g., George C. Thomas, III, Telling
Half-Truths, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 12, 1996, at 20, there is some evidence that false
confessions occur primarily among teenage and emotionally and mentally impaired suspects.
See J. P. Blair, A Test of the Unusual False Confession Perspective: Using Cases of Proven
False Confessions, 41 CRIM. L. BULL. 127 (2005).
142 Rob Warden, Illinois Death Penalty Reform: How it Happened, What it Promises, 95
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 381, 382-83 (2005).
143 Miriam S. Gohara, A Lie for a Lie: False Confessions and the Case for Reconsidering
the Legality of Deceptive Interrogation Techniques, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 791 (2006).
'44 See, e.g., FRED. E. INBAU, JOHN E. REID, JOSEPH P. BUCKLEY & BRIAN C. JAYNE,
CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS (Aspen Publishers 4th ed. 2001) (1962).
145 See DAVID M. BUCKLEY & BRIAN C. JAYNE, ELECTRONIC RECORDING OF
INTERROGATIONS (2005) (approves of videotaping and discusses physical aspects,
interrogator conduct, special situations, and detectives' testimony); Roberto Iraola, The
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Both conservatives and liberals have supported this relatively popular
reform.146 A 1993 Department of Justice report indicated that at least one-
third of all of the police departments in the United States were taping parts
of interrogations. 147  More recently, Thomas Sullivan surveyed 238 law
enforcement agencies of all sizes and types that reported audio- and
videotaping interrogations and confessions and generally found the practice
to be popular. 48 At least six states and the District of Columbia have ruled,
by statute or court decision, on the electronic recording of interrogations or
confessions and either require recording for the investigations of all or some
crimes or allow cautionary instructions where interrogation is not
preserved. 149  Given the extent to which this reform has expanded,
Electronic Recording of Criminal Interrogations, 40 U. RICH. L. REV. 463 (2006) (reviewing
recent state cases concerning videotaping); G. Daniel Lassiter et al., Videotaped
Confessions: Panacea or Pandora's Box?, 28 LAW & POL'Y 192, 193-94 (2006) (angle and
positioning of videotaping confession can influence judgments of voluntariness); Jessica
Silbey, Videotaped Conjessions and the Genre of Documentary, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 789 (2006) (raising caveats about the reliability of videotapes as
representations of reality).
146 Paul G. Cassell, Protecting the Innocent from False Confessions and Lost
Confessions-And from Miranda, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 497, 553-56 (1998)
("conservative"); Steven A. Drizin & Beth A. Colgan, Let the Cameras Roll: Mandatory
Videotaping of Interrogations Is the Solution to Illinois' Problem of False Confessions, 32
LOYOLA U. CHI. L.J. 337 (2001) ("liberal").
147 Drizin & Colgan, supra note 146, at 339-40 (citing William A. Geller, Videotaping
Interrogations and Confessions, in NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
RESEARCH IN BRIEF (Mar. 1993)).
148 THOMAS P. SULLIVAN, CTR. ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, NORTHWESTERN UNIV. SCH.
OF LAW, POLICE EXPERIENCES WITH RECORDING CUSTODIAL INTERROGATIONS (2004),
available at http://www.law.northwestem.edu/depts/clinic/wrongful/documents/
SullivanReport.pdf [hereinafter SULLIVAN, POLICE EXPERIENCES]; see Thomas P. Sullivan,
Police Experiences with Recording Custodial Interrogations, 88 JUDICATURE 132 (2005)
[hereinafter Sullivan, Custodial Interrogations]; Thomas P. Sullivan, Recent Developments:
Electronic Recording of Custodial Interrogations: Everybody Wins, 95 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1127, 1129-30 (2005) [hereinafter Sullivan, Recent Developments].
149 Alaska requires the electronic recording of custodial interrogation as a matter of state
due process. Stephen v. State, 711 P.2d 1156 (Alaska 1985). The District of Columbia
requires the electronic recording of interrogations of persons suspected of committing crimes
of violence that occur "in Metropolitan Police Department interview rooms equipped with
electronic recording equipment" in their entirety; police may record interrogations occurring
in other places, and any violations raise the rebuttable presumption that a resulting admission
is involuntary. D.C. CODE § 5-116.01-116.03 (2006). Illinois requires the electronic
recording of custodial interrogations in the investigation of all homicide crimes and provides
for a number of exceptions. 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 3930/7.2 (2006). Maine requires law
enforcement agencies to adopt written policies with regard to "[d]igital, electronic, audio,
video or other recording of law enforcement interviews of suspects in serious crimes and the
preservation of investigative notes and records in such cases." ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 25
§ 2803-B(I)(K) (2006). Massachusetts allows a defendant to request a cautionary
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knowledge about attitudes of police officials is important for policy
development.
E. LEGAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS ON POLICE
INTERROGATION
From the earliest post-Miranda surveys to recent studies, questions
about the impact of Miranda on interrogation practices have focused on the
effect of the Miranda exclusionary rule. Unlike Fourth Amendment arrest
and search and seizure practices in which civil lawsuits play a role as
control mechanisms, civil lawsuits for Miranda violations are virtually
unknown. 150  Indeed, nearly all courts that have heard the issue have
concluded that no cause of action existed. 5 1 Any abuses occurring during
instruction from the trial judge in a case where "the prosecution introduces evidence of a
defendant's confession or statement that is the product of a custodial interrogation or an
interrogation conducted at a place of detention" and where "interrogating officers have
chosen not to preserve an accurate and complete recording of the interrogation."
Commonwealth v. DiGiambattista, 813 N.E.2d 516, 533 (Mass. 2004). Minnesota mandates
"a recording requirement for all custodial interrogations" under the supervisory powers of its
Supreme Court. State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587 (Minn. 1994). Texas requires the
electronic recording of a defendant's voluntary statements in order for these statements to be
admissible, but does not require the recording of entire interrogations; furthermore, a "person
who swears falsely to facts" that "if true, would render the statement admissible under this
article is presumed to have acted with intent to deceive and with knowledge of the
statement's meaning for the purpose of prosecution for aggravated perjury" and is not
"eligible for probation." TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22(3)(4) (Vernon 2005).
Commonwealth v. DiGiambattista, 813 N.E. 2d at 530, identified appellate opinions in
Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Indiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Tennessee, and Utah that,
although
reluctant to articulate a taping requirement as a matter of State constitutional law, have
acknowledged that recording of interrogations would act as a deterrent to police misconduct,
reduce the number and length of contested motions to suppress, allow for more accurate
resolution of the issues raised in motions to suppress, and at trial on the merits, provide the fact
finder a complete version of precisely what the defendant did (or did not) say in any statement or
confession.
See also United States v. Thornton, 177 F. Supp. 2d 625 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (The court noted,
in dictum, that several jurisdictions videotape interrogations and that in the instant case
"neither the interrogation nor confession were audio or video taped. While electronic
recording is not a constitutional requirement, there is a 'heavy burden' on the government to
show a suspect's waiver of rights was knowing and intelligent.... It certainly harms the
prosecution in a close case when the court cannot evaluate the actual confession. The Court
recommends that the DEA electronically record future interrogations and confessions so a
reviewing court can fully evaluate whether a confession violates Fifth or Fourteenth
Amendment.").
150 Zalman, Paradigm Shift, supra note 56, at 337.
151 See, e.g., Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271, 1291 (11th Cir. 1999); Deshawn E. by
Charlotte E. v. Safir, 156 F.3d 340 (2d Cir. 1998); Riley v. Dorton, 115 F.3d 1159, 1165 (4th
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interrogation have been treated as non-violations of the privilege against
self-incrimination, which was deemed to operate as an exclusionary rule
rather than as a rule that also prohibits compulsion. 52 The sole exception
arose in the Ninth Circuit, which has held in multiple cases that confessions
obtained by duress, even if not admitted into evidence, form the basis of
federal civil rights claims. 53 As noted in Section II.B above, however, the
general availability of civil lawsuits as a method of controlling egregious
interrogation practices under self-incrimination grounds has been
eliminated by Chavez v. Martinez. 54 Any such claim is limited to a facts
and circumstances, substantive due process, "shocks the conscience" test.
55
Although the question of controlling violations of Miranda during
interrogation by means of lawsuits or internal disciplinary sanctions is not
as high on the public agenda as the other issues discussed in this Article, it
raises significant policy questions and is explored in our research.
Cir. 1997) (en banc); Mahan v. Plymouth County House of Corr., 64 F.3d 14, 17 (1st Cir.
1995); Giuffre v. Bissell, 31 F.3d 1241, 1255-57 (3d Cir. 1994); Mahoney v. Kesery, 976
F.2d 1054, 1061-62 (7th Cir. 1992); Warren v. City of Lincoln, 864 F.2d 1436, 1442 (8th
Cir. 1989) (en banc); Davis v. City of Charleston, 827 F.2d 317, 322 (8th Cir. 1987); Bennett
v. Passic, 545 F.2d 1260, 1263 (10th Cir. 1976). But see Cooper v. Dupnik, 963 F.2d 1220
(9th Cir. 1992) (en banc).
152 Steven D. Clymer, Are Police Free to Disregard Miranda? 112 YALE L.J. 447, 488
(2002).
153 Martinez v. City of Oxnard, 270 F.3d 852 (9th Cir. 2001); Cal. Attorneys for Criminal
Justice v. Butts, 195 F.3d 1039 (9th Cir. 1999); Cooper v. Dupnik, 963 F.2d 1220 (9th Cir.
1992) (en banc).
14 538 U.S. 760, 766-67 (2003) (Thomas, J., plurality opinion). Chavez was a complex
decision in which the court rendered multiple opinions as to whether an abusive
interrogation that yielded no confession violated the self-incrimination clause. The Justices
in the plurality, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas, held
that even torture is not actionable under the privilege against self-incrimination, which is
deemed to be only an exclusionary rule. Id. (Thomas, J., plurality opinion). Justices Souter
and Breyer disagreed with Thomas' reasoning, but agreed that in this case no claim for
violation of the privilege of self-incrimination existed. Id. at 778-79 (Souter, J., writing
separately, joined by Breyer, J.). Three dissenters, in an opinion by Justice Kennedy, joined
by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, found that the privilege against self-incrimination is
violated by the use of "severe compulsion or extraordinary pressure" during interrogation
even if no confession is sought to be admitted into evidence. Id. at 789 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
"' Id. at 779-80 (Souter, J., in an opinion for the Court). Various opinions of the
majority of justices who remanded on the due process question leaned toward a finding that
the interrogation violated Martinez's due process rights. See Zalman, Paradigm Shift, supra
note 56, at 349-50.
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III. METHODOLOGY
A. SAMPLE AND SURVEY INSTRUMENT
A questionnaire (see Appendix) was sent to all municipal police
departments in cities or municipal areas with populations greater than
150,000 persons according to the census of state and local law enforcement
agencies. 116 Sheriffs' departments and state police agencies were excluded,
yielding a universe of 144 municipal police departments. The survey was
administered in the summer of 2004, about one year after Chavez was
decided and shortly after Seibert and Patane were announced. 157  Our
questionnaire was a modified version of one developed by Time and Payne,
which they administered to police chiefs in Virginia. 158  We replicated
several questions.159
We employed methods outlined by Dillman to maximize the response
rate. 160 Respondents were given the option of declining to participate. Of
the 144 surveys mailed out, 99 were returned completed (response rate of
68.75%); 20 were returned uncompleted (refusal rate of 13.88%), and 25
ultimately did not respond (non-response rate of 17.36%). The 69%
response rate compares most favorably with other studies of police
agencies. 161
The introductory letter accompanying each survey was addressed to
the chief administrator of each department (chief, commissioner). We
assumed that surveys sent to large departments were likely to be filled out
by an officer to whom the task was delegated. We therefore asked for the
title of the person completing the survey. 162 Our surmise was correct. Only
thirteen surveys were completed by chiefs. Forty-four were completed by
high-level officials (such as assistant chief); four by police legal advisors;
twenty-five by lieutenants; ten by sergeants; and three by police officers.
The responders' ranks immediately raise questions about the interpretation
156 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CENSUS OF STATE AND LOCAL
LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES (CSLLEA), 2000 (2003).
"' Chavez, 538 U.S. 760 (2003), was decided on May 27, 2003; Missouri v. Seibert, 542
U.S. 600 (2004), and United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (2004), were decided on June
28, 2004.
158 Time & Payne, Chiefs'Perceptions, supra note 110.
159 The replicated questions (numbers 1-3, 5-6, and 9-10) are identified in the Appendix
with the question found in Time & Payne, Chiefs' Perceptions, supra note 110.
160 DON. M. DILLMAN, MAIL AND INTERNET SURVEYS: THE TAILORED DESIGN METHOD
(2d ed. 2000).
161 Time and Payne report "a respectable response rate of 55 percent." Time & Payne,
Chiefs' Perceptions, supra note 110, at 79.
162 See Appendix, Question 37.
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of our results. We cannot, for example, use responses to classify "types" of
chiefs, as was done in the qualitative analysis in Payne and Time. 63 As
discussed below, attitudinal questions may reflect the personal views of the
actual responders. On the other hand, questions about actual practices can
be taken to reflect the official understanding of departmental practices. Our
confidence in this assertion is bolstered by the fact that sixty-one of ninety-
nine responders were chiefs, high-ranking officials, or legal advisors, and
that in the smaller departments within our sample, lieutenants or sergeants
are likely to be administrative officers with high responsibilities and access
to the chief. Confidence in the quality of the responses may also be derived
from the high educational attainment of the survey's responders: eighty-
three had at least a bachelor's degree and thirteen of the remaining fourteen
respondents had associates' degrees.'
64
Ninety-six respondents provided their race or ethnicity: seven African
American (7.3%), seventy-seven White (80.2%), eight Hispanic/Latino
(8.3%), and four Other (4.2%). Eighty-nine respondents were male
(91.8%), and eight (8.2%) were female; three did not respond.
Our study suffers from several well-known limitations of survey
research. Respondents must be willing and competent to answer
questions. 165  We believe that the high response rate (68.75%) and the
opportunity to refuse to participate (13.88%) resolved and illuminated the
willingness issue. We anticipated the competence issue by asking for the
rank of the respondent. The large number of respondents who were chiefs
(13), high-level officials (44), and police legal advisors (4) indicates that
two-thirds of the surveys were completed by executive level personnel.
Another twenty-five were completed by lieutenants. We assume that the
lieutenants, sergeants (10), and police officers (3) who responded were in
staff positions and that their views reflected the practices of their agencies.
The fact that one-third of the respondents are not unambiguously police
executives raises validity questions. However, police lieutenants have
managerial responsibilities, and, in many police departments, they may be
163 Payne & Time, Support for Miranda, supra note 110.
164 Five respondents had a law and a graduate degree; four had a law degree; twenty-
eight had a graduate degree; twelve had some graduate work; thirty-four had a bachelor's
degree; thirteen had an associate's degree or some college work; one had a high school
degree; and three did not respond. The educational level in this national sample of large
police departments is higher than that reported for the Virginia chiefs by Time & Payne,
Chiefs' Perceptions, supra note 110, at 80 tbl. l (reporting that sixteen respondents had a
graduate degree; twelve had some graduate work; seventeen had a bachelor's degree; forty-
two had some college work; and eight had a high school degree). For example, 38.1% of the
national sample had graduate or law degrees compared to 16.8% of the Virginia chiefs. Id.
165 See EARL BABBIE, THE BASICS OF SOCIAL RESEARCH 255-57 (3d ed. 2005) (1999).
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executive-level officers. Furthermore, the respondents' high level of
education encourages us in our assumption that they carefully and
competently conveyed information about their departments.
Fixed survey questions have the added limitations of not allowing
respondents to provide context and nuance, of generating biased responses,
of not correcting misunderstood questions, and of being superficial in
capturing the complex reality of a process like interrogation.' 66 We agree
that such limits exist and do not disagree with a respondent who wrote, "the
answers are a little simplistic for a subject that is so complex."' 67  This
constraint is why triangulation of different research methods (observational,
interview, survey) is important. In defense of our method of gathering data
on the impact of confessions law on police agencies, "surveys are a useful
and inexpensive method of obtaining widespread geographical responses
about acceptance decisions and behavioral responses.... [T]hey can do
much to enhance our knowledge of decisional impacts."'
168
B. RESEARCH ISSUES
The questions relating to the five areas explored in this Article are not
entirely contiguous in the survey instrument.
(1) The extent to which Miranda is followed in practice, opinions
about Miranda, and knowledge about recent Supreme Court confessions
decisions. 169 The "law in the books" regarding police practices is put into
effect, modified, or subverted by police officers who have substantial
discretion. 170 An important factor that may mediate compliance with legal
rules is the police chief's attitude. 171 Attitudes of administrators cannot be
separated from their knowledge. A cluster of questions inquired into the
attitudes and knowledge of the respondents and the practices in their
166 Id. at 285; see also ROYCE A. SINGLETON, JR., BRUCE C. STRAITS & MARGARET
MILLER STRAITS, APPROACHES TO SOCIAL RESEARCH 254-65 (2d ed. 1993) (1988).
167 Respondent "I." Only nine respondents of the ninety-nine who completed surveys
offered written comments. We have designated them by letter from "A" to "I."
168 Canon, supra note 6, at 445-46.
169 See infra Appendix, Questions 1-3, 5-6, 9-10, 12-13, 14, 21, 25-26.
170 JEANINE BELL, POLICING HATRED: LAW ENFORCEMENT, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND HATE
CRIME 48-83 (2002); Joseph Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal
Process: Low-Visibility Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543, 552-54
(1960).
171 See WILLIAM BRATTON WITH PETER KNOBLER, TURNAROUND 242-44 (1998); Bradley
C. Canon, Testing the Effectiveness of Civil Liberties Policies at the State and Federal
Levels: The Case of the Exclusionary Rule, 5 AM. POL. Q. 57 (1977) [hereinafter Canon,
Testing the Effectiveness].
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departments. In this section, we compare the responses of our national
sample to that of police chiefs in Virginia.172
(2) Interrogation "outside Miranda" and methods of interrogation
designed to minimize the effect of Miranda warnings.173  Interrogation
"outside Miranda" is a contentious issue. A study of published appellate
cases downplays its significance, 174 although Missouri v. Seibert175 offers
some evidence that it may be prevalent. Our survey provides a timely
source of information on the national scope of the practice and whether it is
a regional or a national practice.
(3) Knowledge about false confessions and practices that might
encourage false confessions. 176 Concerns with actual innocence and false
confessions have become high priority issues in legal and criminal justice
scholarship. 177  The sensitivity of police officials to these issues is an
important mediating factor in estimating whether police departments will
respond with reform efforts.
(4) Electronic recording of interrogations and confessions. 78  The
videotaping of full interrogation sessions is an issue on the action agenda of
many police departments. 79  A national survey explores in detail the
practices of departments that already audio- or videotape interrogations or
confessions. 180 The present survey adds valuable data by indicating what
proportion of large police departments across the nation utilize these
methods.
(5) Controls on interrogation practices, including lawsuits, department
discipline and court-ordered injunctions.' 8' There is very little national
172 Time & Payne, Chiefs'Perceptions, supra note 110.
173 See infra Appendix, Questions: 4, 15, 19-20, 22-24, 27-30.
174 Thomas, III, supra note 73, at 1998.
17' 542 U.S. 600 (2004).
176 See infra Appendix, Questions: 11, 17-18, 33.
177 E.g., Symposium, Innocence in Capital Sentencing, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
371-651 (2005); Symposium, No Longer "An Unreal Dream ": Wrongful Convictions After
the DNA Revolution, 41 CRIM. L. BULL. 109-94 (2005); Special Issue on Wrongful
Conviction, 88 JUDICATURE 67-121 (2003).
178 See infra Appendix, Questions 7-8, 35-36.
179 See, e.g., Noah Schaffer, Legacy of Supreme Judicial Court's Decision about
Confessions to Police That Are Not Tape-Recorded, MASS. LAWYERS WEEKLY, Apr. 2, 2007
(Lexis news library); Bob Gardinier, Police to Get Video Cameras; $50,000 Grant Will Help
Four Departments Record Questioning of Suspects, TIMES UNION (Albany, New York), Mar.
23, 2007; Adam Liptak, Relying on the Notepad in the Electronic Age, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12,
2007 (noting that "[m]ore than 500 police departments in all 50 states now make electronic
recordings of at least some interrogations, often videotaping them").
180 Sullivan, Custodial Interrogations, supra note 148.
's1 See infra Appendix, Questions 16, 31-32, 34.
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information on civil liability and internal sanctioning and controls in regard
to interrogation practices. This survey provides baseline data that can be
helpful in fostering national standards.
These issue areas are not entirely distinct. Thus, the kinds of practices
involved in interrogating "outside Miranda" may be similar to the kinds of
aggressive questioning associated with false confessions, and the issue of
videotaping interrogations cannot be divorced from the underlying concern
with false confessions. Knowledge and attitudes about confessions law
may have an influence on the four other issue clusters and may be
positively related to a department's mechanisms for internal sanctioning.
Although readers may find the issue-by-issue approach in the following
sections somewhat tedious, all of the questions relate in one way or another
to overarching concerns about the effectiveness of law as a mode of
controlling illegal or unconstitutional government behavior. 1
82
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
A. ATTITUDES AND PRACTICES CONCERNING MIRANDA
We begin with the bottom line question: should Miranda be
abolished?183 There is a large percentage difference between the responses
of the sample of Virginia's chiefs and the respondents representing the
largest police departments in the nation. Over two-fifths of Virginia's
chiefs support (agree and strongly agree) eliminating Miranda, compared
with only 12.4% of the national respondents-a 30% difference. Whether
opposition to Miranda is the result of a chief's ideological position or
frustration with the impact of Miranda on interrogation in practice, 18 4 it is
182 The discussion of results in Section IV proceeds section by section and question by
question, in accordance with the conventions of writing in social scientific journals.
However, much of the text does not simply restate the information found in the tables with
analysis left to the conclusion, but adheres to the freer conventions of legal discourse, offers
comments, and even speculates about the results.
183 Question 12 (Table 1) was modified from that used by Time & Payne, Chiefs'
Perceptions, supra note I 10, at 81 tbl.2 Question 6, because their question was geared to the
impending Dickerson decision. As in the Time & Payne study, we ignore missing data in
reporting the results of Likert-type questions. See Time & Payne, Chiefs 'Perceptions, supra
note 110, at 81 tbl.2 (number (n) of responses to questions in Table 2 vary, missing data not
reported).
184 Time and Payne found significant relationships between experience with Miranda
measured by cases "thrown out as a result of Miranda" and positive answers to the following
statements: "the Courts are too cautious with regard to interpretations of Miranda"; "too
many get off easy as a result of the Miranda warnings"; "Miranda is useful in principle but
not in practice"; "Miranda makes it difficult for officers to do their jobs"; "Miranda hinders
voluntary confessions"; and "prosecutors have a hard time prosecuting cases when offenders
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clear that respondents administering larger departments across the nation
are far more comfortable with Miranda and, reflecting Chief Justice
Burger's "accommodation" statement in Rhode Island v. Innis,1 85 have
learned to coexist with Miranda. This large degree of acceptance,
compared to the degree of acceptance of the Virginia police chiefs, suggests
that different cultures of policing exist, which may be a function of
departmental size or of region. It may also be a reflection of the higher
reported educational level of the national respondents compared to the
Virginia police chiefs as well as potential unmeasured differences in the
experiential backgrounds between the two samples.
The similar proportion of national and Virginia police executives
(about 10% in each study) who strongly disagree with abolition suggests
that a small proportion of police officials in departments of all sizes are
strongly committed to the values of the original vision of Miranda, which
contemplated real changes in the behavior of police officers conducting
interrogations in the direction of providing greater constitutional protections
to suspects. 186  The larger proportion in the national sample that only
disagrees with dismantling Miranda (77.3%) suggests a more pragmatic
and less ideological opposition to that ruling. Nevertheless, the responses
in Time and Payne, 187 which may reflect responses in smaller police
departments across the nation or may just reflect responses in Virginia,
suggest that there is a reservoir of wariness about Miranda, which may be
used to justify such oppositional techniques as interrogation "outside
Miranda." Only nine respondents submitted written comments in this
study, and one included a passionate dissent to Miranda: "The criminal
justice system should be concerned with seeking the truth. If an officer is
acting in good faith, evidence obtained should not be excluded. Read
'Guilty: The collapse of criminal justice' [sic] by Judge Harold
Rothwax."'188  As the data in Table 1 show, however, this opinion is a
exercise their rights to remain silent." Time & Payne, Chiefs' Perceptions, supra note 110,
at 82-83. In contrast, there was a non-significant relation between a negative experience
with Miranda and positive answers to the statement "the Court should overturn the Miranda
warnings once and for all." Id. These responses suggest that a fully comprehensive study of
the impact of Miranda in practice should combine observations with a survey and interviews
of the detectives who conduct interrogations and their supervisors.
185 "The meaning of Miranda has become reasonably clear and law enforcement
practices have adjusted to its strictures; I would neither overrule Miranda, disparage it, nor
extend it at this late date." Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 304 (1980) (Burger, C.J.,
concurring).
186 Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, supra note 3, at 117-25.
187 Time & Payne, Chiefs'Perceptions, supra note 1 10 at 81, tbl 2.
188 Respondent "C" (citing HAROLD J. ROTHWAX, GUILTY: THE COLLAPSE OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE (1997)).
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distinct minority view among national police executives. Further research
exploring views about Miranda in different types and sizes of agencies
could shed light on the level of global support for or opposition to Miranda.
Respondents' general views about Miranda can also be gauged from
their responses to opinion Questions 13 and 14, which recite simplified
factual scenarios in United States v. Patane189 and Missouri v. Seibert,
190
decided shortly before the survey was mailed. These cases were so recent
that we could not be sure that respondents were familiar with them, and so
we provided capsule fact patterns that did not capture the nuances of the
Court's opinions, especially for Seibert.
Table 1
Abolish Miranda? Attitudes Concerning Miranda Exceptions
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Disagree Agree Agree
n(%) n(%) n(%) n(%)
Time & Payne: The Supreme Court
should overturn the Miranda decision 11 43 18 21
once and for all. (Q 6) 19 1  (11.8) (46.2) (19.4) (22.6)
12. In Dickerson (2000) the Supreme
Court ruled that Miranda is constitutional. 10 75 10 2
The Supreme Court should have abolished (10.3) (77.3) (10.3) (2.1)
mandatory Miranda warnings.
13. In June 2004 the Supreme Court ruled
that a gun is admissible in evidence if
taken after an admission to an officer who
did not complete giving Miranda 1 1 72 21
warnings. There was no public safety (1.1) (1.1) (75.8) (22.1)
issue. What is your opinion of this
decision in U.S. v. Patane?
14. In June 2004 the Supreme Court ruled
a confession inadmissible if obtained in a
two-stage station house interrogation,
where no Miranda warnings are given in 7 27 54 5
the first interrogation, but are given in the (7.5) (29.0) (58.1) (5.4)
second interrogation. What is your
opinion of this decision in Missouri v.
Siebert?
189 542 U.S. 630 (2004).
190 542 U.S. 600 (2004).
191 The numbers of the questions appearing in this Table and the following Tables
correspond to the numbering in the survey instrument found in the Appendix. The number
of the question in Time & Payne's Chiefs' Perceptions survey, supra note 110, is added
parenthetically.
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It is notable that the majority of respondents agreed with the majority
decision in each case. A more detailed exploration geared to developing
and testing theories of the impact of law could have asked whether they
were already aware of the decisions, and whether they were aware of the
ostensibly inadvertent nature of the Miranda violation in Patane and the
deliberate trap set for the suspect in Seibert. In any event, the agreement
92
among almost two-thirds of the respondents with the decision in Seibert,
holding the confession to be inadmissible, shows that police executives do
not reflexively favor any method that allows the introduction of
confessions. 193 It is also worth noting that virtually all respondents agreed
with the admissibility of the gun in Patane, compared to a sizeable minority
of respondents (over one-third) who felt that the "cured" statement in
Seibert should have been admissible. These results reflect the less
problematic nature of the facts in Patane and some dissatisfaction with the
"game-playing" with Miranda in Seibert.
United States v. Patane and Missouri v. Seibert are the latest in a long
train of Miranda decisions. 194 The overwhelming agreement of respondents
with the Patane decision may reflect a pragmatic approach to Miranda by
police executives who largely accept Miranda as part of the landscape in
their work environment. The officer in Patane made a bumbling attempt to
comply with Miranda by not completing the sequence of questions, so the
Court excused this error to allow the introduction of physical evidence of a
crime. Our conclusion-that the responses of the national sample of police
executives reflected a pragmatic rather than a cynical stance toward
Miranda-is further supported by the majority agreement with the Seibert
decision, although 36.5% would have allowed this end-run around Miranda
(Question 14).
Table 2 compares the responses of the Virginia chiefs to our sample of
national police executives. 95 Except for Question 1, where there is close
192 Hereinafter, unless it is otherwise indicated, the term "agreement" used in the text to
describe the responses to Likert-type questions means the sum of the "agree" + "strongly
agree" responses, and disagreement means the sum of the "disagree" + "strongly disagree"
responses.
'93 Two respondents (Respondents "A" and "H"), one of whom stated that he or she did
not answer these questions, said that the opinions of any police officer about a Supreme
Court decision is "totally irrelevant" and that "this is not for us as police officers to say. Our
role is to ensure that the rulings are followed, not to complain because they may be
inconvenient to the police function."
194 See supra Part I.B.
195 The wording of the questions in Table 2 was identical in our survey and in Time and
Payne's survey, from which the questions were derived. Time & Payne, Chiefs'
Perceptions, supra note 1 10, at 81 tbl.2.
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agreement between the Virginia and national samples, 96 the other six
questions reveal interesting differences. In Question 1, a large minority of
respondents in the national sample (approximately 40%) answered that
Miranda warnings need not be routinely read. 197 Their disagreement could
mean that (1) obtaining a confession is not essential in all prosecutions; (2)
defense attorneys or courts are not scrupulous in guarding against Miranda
abuses; or (3) reading Miranda warnings is not a component of a lawful
arrest. The last interpretation of Question 1 (and Question 2) best fits its
wording, although some respondents might have applied their conclusion to
stationhouse questioning as well.
Table 2
Opinion Questions About Miranda-Comparing Answers of Virginia and
National Samples
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Disagree Agree Agree
n(%) n(%) n(%) n(%)
1. In order to prevent the
dismissal of a case, arresting
officers must routinely read
offenders their Miranda
rights.
Virginia sample 15 (16.1) 26(28.0) 31 (33.3) 21 (22.6)
(T&P Q I)
National sample 16(16.5) 23 (23.7) 33 (34.0) 25 (25.8)




Virginia sample 0(0.0) 5 (5.3) 49(51.6) 41(43.2)
(T&P Q2)
National sample 5 (5.1) 22 (22.4) 37 (37.8) 34(34.7)
3. Courts are too cautious
with regard to the Miranda
warnings.
Virginia sample 3 (3.2) 33 (35.1) 35 (37.2) 23 (24.5)
(T&P Q4)
National sample 2 (2.0) 70 (70.7) 23 (23.2) 4 (4.0)
196 Question 1 reports that almost 56% of the Virginia chiefs and almost 60% of the
national sample of police administrators support the view that Miranda warnings must be
routinely read to prevent dismissal of the case. Time & Payne, Chiefs' Perceptions, supra
note 110, at 81 tbl.2.
197 See supra note 196.
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Strongly Strongly
Disagree Disagree Agree Agree
n(%) n(%) n(%) n(%)
5. Too many offenders get off
easy as a result of Miranda
warnings.
Virginia sample 8 (8.5) 45 (47.9) 19 (20.2) 22 (23.4)
(T&P Q5)
National sample 12(12.2) 77(78.6) 8(8.2) 1 (1.0)
6. The Miranda warnings are
useful in principle but
ineffective in practice.
Virginia sample(T&P Q7)l 9(9.6) 46 (48.9) 23 (24.5) 16 (17.0)
National sample 9(9.4) 73 (76.0) 13 (13.5) 1 (1.0)
9. The requirement to read
suspects the Miranda
warnings makes it difficult for
people to do their jobs.
Virginia sample 10(10.5) 51 (53.7) 23(24.2) 11(11.6)
(T&P Q 12)
National sample 18(18.2) 68(68.7) 11 (11.1) 2(2.0)
10. Miranda warnings hinder
voluntary confessions.
Virginia sample 9(9.5) 36(37.9) 31 (32.6) 19(20.0)
(T&P Q 13)
National sample 7(7.1) 66(66.7) 25(25.3) 1 (1.0)
This straightforward interpretation of Questions 1 and 2 is supported
by a written comment: "Regarding Q I & 2: Miranda is routinely read to
suspects if being questioned regarding the crime. If not being questioned-
then Miranda is not read. Most patrol officers do not question offender-
just obtains information for booking. Detectives routinely read Miranda
during investigation process."'199 Another respondent, however, indicated
that the law of the respondent's state "requires the advising of Miranda
Rights and the notification of intended charges to all arrested subjects. No
direct instructions apply to non-arrests, interviews, and the like. This is the
'gray-area' where Miranda vs. Non-Miranda rears its head. 200  In any
event, Question 2 shows that Virginia departments (94.8% agreement)
198 We report the n's from Time & Payne, Chiefs'Perceptions, supra note 110, at 81, but
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adhere more closely to the letter of Miranda than large police departments
in the national sample (72.5% agreement). Whether Miranda warnings are
given routinely in felony arrests and whether such a practice influences the
obtaining of admissions at the time of arrest and subsequent interrogation
practices are issues for further research.
The other questions in Table 2 deal with attitudes toward Miranda.
Although a majority of the national and Virginia respondents in Questions 5
("Get off easy as a result of Miranda warnings") and 9 ("Difficult to do
their jobs") believe that Miranda does not undermine the police function,
the two samples differ sharply. Almost half of the Virginia respondents felt
that because of Miranda too many offenders get off easy, and over a third
of the Virginia respondents felt that Miranda made it difficult for police to
do their jobs. Less than 10% of the national respondents, a negligible
minority, felt that Miranda created such impediments.20 1 This may be a
result of the higher compliance rate reported for Virginia departments
compared to the national sample (Questions 1 & 2). Because Virginia
departments are smaller and handle fewer cases, we speculate that the effect
of rulings that led to lost cases may be more psychologically salient for the
Virginia chiefs than for executives in the largest police departments.20 2
The national and Virginia respondents disagreed over Question 10
("Miranda warnings hinder voluntary confessions"), with a slim majority of
the Virginia chiefs agreeing (52.6%) but only one-quarter (26.3%) of the
national respondents agreeing. Further research could explore the basis for
this difference, and whether detectives in large police departments are more
adept at obtaining confessions.
Responses to Questions 25 and 26 (Table 3) concern general written
policies on Miranda law.20 3  In Question 25, eighty-four departments
201 A similar pattern is displayed in the responses to Question 6, in which over 40% of
the Virginia chiefs felt that Miranda was ineffective in practice, compared to only 14% of
the executives and high-ranking officers responding in the national sample. A similar result
is found in Question 3 ("Courts too cautious"): 62% of the Virginia chiefs agreed, compared
to only 27% of the national respondents. These responses suggest that police executives in
large departments accommodate the Miranda requirements more easily than the chiefs of
Virginia police departments, who represent a spectrum of departments that include smaller
agencies.
202 We speculate that national police executives may be less bothered by Miranda
requirements than the Virginia chiefs in part because their spans of responsibility are broader
and they have a less parochial interest in or memory of specific cases.
203 Questions in Tables 3 through 9 were designed to probe the policy issues raised in the
present study and were administered to the national sample of executives of large police
agencies. Further research that compares our results with those in smaller police
departments might yield interesting information as to whether police procedures vary by
agency size.
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indicated that they had written policies, and fourteen replied that they had
none. Only sixty-eight respondents replied to Question 26: three replied
that the policies are too legalistic and not helpful; forty-two replied that the
policies include helpful examples; and twenty-three provided responses
under "other." For the most part, the "other" responses indicated that the
departmental policies followed state law or nationally-accepted standards,
and that they encourage the reading of Miranda warnings. Only one
response suggested that more targeted guidelines exist ("specifics for
homicide and child abuse/sex crimes"). It may be surprising that as many
as fourteen departments among the largest in the United States do not have
written Miranda policies. Practices in these fourteen departments,
however, may not differ significantly from departments with written
policies, especially if written policies simply track the law in an effort to
avoid complications in civil suits.
Table 3
Questions About Written Policies and the Influence of the Chief
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Disagree Agree Agree
n(%) n(%) n(%) n(%)
21. The police chiefs
views of Miranda law
have a major impact on 7(7.2) 25(25.8) 31(32.0) 34(35.1)
law compliance in his/her
police department.
Yes No Missing
25. Does your department
have general written
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Responses in Tables 2 and 3 raise interesting questions about Miranda
compliance by suggesting that written guidelines are only moderately
helpful in structuring officers' behaviors during interrogation and in helping
to ensure compliance with the law. A positive written response stated:
About Miranda in general, we have specific policy that reflects current case law,
written with the help of specialist attorney [sic], who also trains every one of our
officers. I feel very good about our understanding and ap lication of Miranda in our
daily operations, and we have had no problems in this area.
Written policies may be useful in some departments, but only about
half of the departments with policies rated them as having helpful
examples. This disparity suggests that training programs and on-the-job
learning may be as or even more important in guiding interrogation
practices than written policies per se. Further research into the influence of
policies and training on interrogation practices in different departments may
prove useful in developing policies that are of greater utility to the police.
Finally, in response to Question 21 in Table 3, two-thirds of
respondents (67.1%) agreed that the police chief's views of Miranda have
an impact on compliance. This high agreement rate supports the limited
research and anecdotal evidence indicating that the police chief is an
important mediating factor in compliance with constitutional standards.2 °5
Negative replies are ambiguous; they could either mean that officers in the
department disregard a chief's leadership on complying with constitutional
rules, or that officers would comply with constitutional mandates despite a
chief's indifference. Evidence suggests that the leadership of police chiefs
can be an important variable in influencing the styles of policing utilized in
municipalities. 0 6 Further research comparing leadership styles and law
compliance in different police departments could shed light on this
important issue.
B. INTERROGATION OUTSIDE MIRANDA AND MIRANDA-MINIMIZATION
In Table 4, we report on Miranda-minimization (Question 4) and
attitudes about interrogation "outside Miranda" (Questions 15, 19, and 20);
that is, delivering Miranda warnings in a manner that makes them seem
inconsequential. There is almost universal disagreement with Miranda-
minimization. However, a lesser majority disapproves of the various forms
of interrogation "outside Miranda." Question 4 puts the matter starkly and
204 Respondent "H."
205 BRATTON WITH KNOBLER, supra note 171; Canon, Testing the Effectiveness, supra
note 171.
206 BRATrON WITH KNOBLER, supra note 171; JEROME H. SKOLNICK & JAMES J. FYFE,
ABOVE THE LAW: POLICE AND THE EXCESSIVE USE OF FORCE 172-92 (1993).
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seems to be at odds with the scholarly and journalistic writing that implies
that Miranda-minimization is prevalent. °7 There may be no way to assess
its prevalence, as what constitutes minimization lies in the eye of the
beholder. That no respondents strongly agreed with Question 4 implies that
police officials do not condone the outright flouting of Miranda's warnings
requirement. The disagreement with Miranda minimization (93.7%)
indirectly supports the empirical findings of Leo and of Cassel and
Hayman, indicating high levels of success in obtaining admissions and
confessions through routine interrogation.20 8
Table 4
Opinion Questions About Interrogation Outside Miranda and Miranda
Minimization Practices
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Disagree Agree Agree
n(%) n(%) n(%) n(%)
4. Detectives should read
Miranda warnings in a way to 30(31.6) 59(62.1) 6(6.3) 0(0.0)
make them seem unimportant.
15. An officer should be
permitted to continue in-
custody questioning after an
offender says he does not 23 (23.5) 58 (59.2) 13 (13.3) 4 (4.1)
want to talk or asks for a
lawyer.
19. A statement taken in
violation of Miranda should
be used to impeach an 11(11.6) 45 (47.4) 32(33.7) 7(7.4)
offender's credibility on the
witness stand.
20. A statement taken in
violation of Miranda should 8 (8.4) 47(49.5) 38 (40.0) 2(2.1)
be used to get leads about a
case.
Focusing on interrogation "outside Miranda" (Question 15), only one-
sixth of the respondents supported this practice (17.4%). In contrast
approximately two-fifths supported the use of illegally obtained statements
to impeach an offender's credibility or to get leads about the case
207 DAVID SIMON, HOMICIDE: A YEAR ON THE KILLING STREETS 204-20 (1991); Leo &
White, Adapting to Miranda, supra note 12, at 432-39.
208 Cassel & Hayman, supra note 17, at 891-904; Leo, Interrogation Room, supra note
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(Questions 19 and 20).209 A curious feature about the Table 4 responses is
that the police executives reacted more negatively toward minimization
(Question 4),21 which does not violate of the letter of Miranda. In contrast,
they reacted less negatively to the more questionable practice of flouting the
Miranda requirement of immediately ceasing to interrogate when a suspect
invokes his rights (i.e., interrogation "outside Miranda") (Question 15),
which does violate the letter as well as the spirit of Miranda.21   The
difference may be due in part to the wording of the questions, with
"detectives" identified as the subject of Question 4 compared to "an officer"
as the subject of Question 15.
Questions in Table 5 inquired into respondents' knowledge about the
then recently decided case of Chavez v. Martinez,212 knowledge about
interrogation "outside Miranda," and the existence of written or unwritten
policies regarding the practice. Slightly over half of the respondents had
heard of the Chavez case, decided about a year before the survey was
mailed (Question 22). Chavez was not a criminal case involving the
admissibility of a statement, but a civil suit dealing with an officer's and a
department's liability. Such an issue should be of greater interest to high-
ranking police officials than to detectives. It may be that knowledge of
recent Supreme Court rulings in large police departments is a mid-level
concern among police executives with wide ranges of responsibility, and
that it is seen as a specialized task. Keeping track of recent court decisions
may be delegated to legal-division officers. More specific research into
how the personnel of different-sized police departments obtain knowledge
of legal trends is needed to update Stephen Wasby's pioneering work on the
subject.213
209 Question 19: 41.1% agreed that a statement taken in violation of Miranda should be
used to impeach an offender's credibility on the stand (the Harris v. New York, 401 U.S.
222, 225-26 (1971), and Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 722-24 (1975), exception); Question
20: 42.1% agreed that a statement taken in violation of Miranda should be used to get leads
about a case (the Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 451-52 (1974), and United States v.
Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 644 (2004), exception). Responses to Question 20 are in tension with
responses to Question 14 in Table 1. See text at notes 251 to 253 infra.
210 Concerning minimization, one of the authors has proposed a "quixotic" reform
(among others) that would have a pre-recorded video of Miranda questions read by a chief
judge to a suspect prior to stationhouse interrogation. Zalman, Tea Leaves, supra note 56, at
366-68.
21 1 Re-interrogation is allowable under a variety of circumstances. See Michigan v.
Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 102-03 (1975).
212 538 U.S. 760 (2003).
213 WASBY, SMALL TowN POLICE, supra note 81.
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Table 5




22. Chavez v. Martinez (2003)
held that an officer cannot be
held civilly liable for failure to
give Miranda warnings. Have 51 (51.5) 48 (48.5) 0 (0.0)
you heard about Chavez v.
Martinez prior to this survey?
23. Have you heard of a
practice known as interrogation
"outside Miranda" prior to this 55 (55.6) 43 (43.4) 1(1.0)
survey?
27. In the past decade has your
Department had a written
policy allowing interrogation 5 (5.1) 91 (91.9) 3 (3.0)
"outside Miranda"?
28. If "Yes," was the policy
terminated? 2(2.0) 7(7.1) 90(90.9)
29. In the past decade has your
Department had an unwritten
policy allowing interrogation 7 (7.1) 90(90.9) 2(2.0)
"outside Miranda"?
30. If "Yes," is the practice 9 (9.1) 2 (2.0) 88 (88.9)
discouraged?
Knowledge of the prevalence and distribution of interrogation "outside
Miranda" is undoubtedly important policy information, impelling
Weisselberg to survey California police departments about such
214practices. It was apparently on Justice Souter's mind in his majority
opinion in Missouri v. Seibert: "The technique of interrogating in
successive, unwarned and warned phases raises a new challenge to
Miranda. Although we have no statistics on the frequency of this practice,
it is not confined to Rolla, Missouri. '15  Slightly more than half of the
respondents had heard about the practice phrased as interrogation "outside
Miranda" (Question 23).
214 Weisselberg, In the Stationhouse, supra note 95; Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, supra
note 3.
215 542 U.S. 600, 609 (2004).
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Questions 27 and 28 ask about written policies concerning
interrogation "outside Miranda," while Questions 29 and 30 ask about
unwritten policies. A very small number of departments-only twelve-
claim to have had written or unwritten policies concerning interrogation
"outside Miranda." Recall that eighty-four departments (84.8%) had
general written policies concerning interrogation.216 Because Ninth Circuit
cases prior to Chavez v. Martinez upheld potential civil rights lawsuits
217against police, we asked whether written policies were terminated after
Chavez or whether unwritten policies were discouraged (Questions 27-30).
Two out of five departments that had written interrogation "outside
Miranda" policies had cancelled them, while a paradoxical result of
Questions 29 and 30 indicates that more departments discouraged
interrogation "outside Miranda" than had unwritten policies allowing such
interrogation. The paradox may be explained by speculating that a few
departments that did not have unwritten policies discouraged the practice
nonetheless when its existence became known. The survey results support
a hypothesis that interrogation "outside Miranda" was formerly a California
practice, as three departments with written policies and six departments
with unwritten policies concerning interrogation "outside Miranda" were in
California and five California departments reported discouraging the
practice.
Based on Weisselberg's articles, we speculated that knowledge about
Chavez and interrogation "outside Miranda" would be highest in California
and higher in the Western states than in other regions, even though
Weisselberg did cite cases from a number of states identifying the practice.
The data in Table 6, however, do not support this hypothesis, as knowledge
of Chavez was comparable in all of the regions and a majority of the
respondents had heard about interrogation "outside Miranda." The data do
show greater awareness of Chavez in California, the state in which the case
originated,2' 8 and greater awareness there of interrogation "outside
Miranda," where formal training in the practice seems to have originated.
This point is supported by a respondent who surmised: "In California we
have had many debates on the practice of questioning outside 'Miranda.'
Many agencies and instructors actively condone this practice, some making
216 See supra Table 3, Question 25.
217 See discussion supra Part II.B.
218 We speculate that because police chiefs typically belong to a statewide Chiefs'
Association, they may become informed of cases of local interest or provenance through the
mailings or electronic messages of the association or at annual meetings. By this and other
means, it is likely that police chiefs within a state will be aware of legal developments
affecting a sister department, especially where the result of the case may impact their own
departments.
[Vol. 97
A TTITUDES OF POLICE EXECUTIVES
it 'pattern and practice.' This resulted in several abuses and has caused the
court to take action against these abuses.
' 219
Table 6
Knowledge of Chavez and Interrogation "Outside Miranda" by Region
Yes
n (%)
22. Have you heard about Chavez v.








23. Have you heard of a practice known as



































Question 24 (not reported in a table) asked
respondent first heard of the practice, eliciting
the year in which the
forty-seven responses.
Eleven (23.4%) indicated "unknown," "do not remember," or a similar
response. Fourteen (29.8%) indicated 1990 and earlier, with two in the
1970s. The older dates may suggest that the respondents are confusing
interrogation "outside Miranda" with another practice. It may also be,
however, that while the label and the deliberate practice derived from the
teachings of police legal trainers in the mid-1990s, the actual practice may
be older. Seven (14.9%) gave dates between 1994 and 1999, and fifteen
(31.9%) gave dates of 2000 and later (or written statements indicating
"recent" or "new" awareness). The fact that twice as many respondents
learned about interrogation "outside Miranda" after 1999 than those who
219 Respondent "1."
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learned about it in the 1990s shows that knowledge of this policy
innovation has increased since its debut.
C. FALSE CONFESSIONS: ATTITUDES AND PRACTICES
A comparison of the responses to Question 11 ("Interrogation may
produce wrongful conviction": strongly disagree and disagree = 73.7%) and
to Question 17 ("Officers should be persistent": agree and strongly agree =
70.9%) in Table 7 is a measure of the distance between the wrongful
conviction scholarship and the working beliefs of executives in large police
departments. 220  False confessions figure prominently in studies of actual
innocence but are probably not a top agenda item for police executives.2
The existence of wrongful convictions has been undeniable for well over a
decade, but the extent of the problem is subject to question. Gross et al.
have established the existence of 340 official exonerations between 1989
and 2003 and have additionally identified several hundred mass-
exonerations.222 They reasonably speculate that several thousand wrongful
convictions occur each year. 3  The fact that only a tiny percent of
convictions leads to known exonerations and that even these are often
vigorously challenged by prosecutors 224 indicates that law enforcement
agencies will tend to be wary about adopting proposed reforms.
220 See Drizin & Leo, supra note 4 (demonstrating the existence of false confessions and
implying that false confessions are not rare).
221 See INNOCENCE COMM'N FOR VA., A VISION FOR JUSTICE: REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS IN THE COMMONWEALTH OF
VIRGINIA 9-10, 42-59 (2005), available at http://www.thejusticeproject.org/press/reports/
pdfs/1724l.pdf (last visited May 9, 2007).
222 Gross et al., supra note 137, at 527-28. Of these 340 official exonerations, 144 were
based on DNA, and 195 on other evidence of innocence. Id. The mass exonerations include
those released in the aftermath of the Ramparts police corruption episode in Los Angeles and
the exonerations and gubernatorial pardons in the aftermath of the Tulia, Texas police
misfeasance episode. Id. at 533-35. Also not included in official exonerations are those that
resulted from a number of bizarre, ritual sex abuse prosecutions and convictions. See, e.g.,
EDWARD HUMES, MEAN JUSTICE: A TOWN'S TERROR, A PROSECUTOR'S POWER, A BETRAYAL
OF INNOCENCE 449-53 (1999); DOROTHY RABINOWITZ, No CRUELER TYRANNIES:
ACCUSATION, FALSE WITNESS AND OTHER TERRORS OF OUR TIMES (2003).
223 Gross et al., supra note 137, at 529-33.
224 Judith A. Goldberg & David M. Siegel, The Ethical Obligations of Prosecutors in
Cases Involving Postconviction Claims of Innocence, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 389, 394-5, 412
(2002) (prosecutors' reaction to prisoners' requests for DNA testing range from support to
resistance); Seth Kreimer & David Rudovsky, Double Helix, Double Bind: Factual
Innocence and Postconviction DNA Testing, 151 U. PA. L. REv. 547 (2002) (examples of
prosecutorial support of and resistance to post-conviction DNA testing detailed); Daniel S.
Medwed, The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance to Post-Conviction Claims of Innocence,
84 B. U. L. REV. 125 (2004) (explores reasons for prosecutorial resistance and proposes
reforms); Fred C. Zacharias, The Role of Prosecutors in Serving Justice After Convictions,
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Our data suggest that proposed changes in interrogation practices are
likely to face sustained resistance from police officials, interrogating
officers, and perhaps also from the police training industry. The responses
to these questions are hardly surprising. Interrogating officers are in the
business of obtaining confessions for the purpose of securing convictions,
aaid as the observational studies show, they do so with a high degree of
success. 225 Challenges to the mode of taking confessions will likely be
interpreted by police officials as an attack on the entire enterprise of
criminal investigation and may meet with a reflexive anti-reform stance.
Reforms that seek to avoid some of the egregious examples of false
confessions, especially those obtained from the vulnerable populations of
youths and the mentally defective, 226 however, ought not to result in the
wholesale undermining of interrogation. It is not insignificant that in
Question 11, slightly over a quarter of the respondents were willing to
concede that interrogation techniques sometimes help to produce false
confessions.
Table 7
Opinions About False Confessions
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Disagree Agree Agree
n(%) n(%) n(%) n(%)
11. Interrogation techniques




encouraged to be verbally 1 (1.1) 26(28.0) 59(63.4) 7 (7.5)
persistent in order to obtain
admissions.
18. The Reid interrogation training 1 (1.5) 29(43.9) 34(51.5) 2(3.0)
method is the best available.
We also asked about the training provided by John E. Reid &
Associates, Inc., which we believe is the largest and best-known training
program for police interrogations. The portion of the company's website
58 VAND. L. REV. 171 (2005) (prosecutors ill-equipped to analyze post-trial obligations to
serve justice because law on issues is limited, incentives are negative, and issues are
complex).
225 Cassell & Hayman, supra note 17, at 892-904; Leo, Interrogation Room, supra note
70, at 280.
226 Blair, supra note 141, at 136.
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devoted to its interviewing and interrogation training program claims that
"[m]ore than 300,000 professionals in the law enforcement and security
fields have attended this three day program since it was first offered in
1974. ",227 The so-called "Reid method" was developed by the late Fred
Inbau and John Reid and is explained in great detail in their book.228 It is
based on nine steps listed on the web page: theme development; handling
denials; overcoming objections; procuring and retaining the suspect's
attention; handling the suspect's passive mood; presenting an alternative
question; detailing the offense; and elements of oral and written
229
statements. It is precisely this method that has been the subject of
criticism by scholars who have explored and decried false confessions.230
Sixty-six respondents answered Question 18, which asks whether the
"Reid training method is the best available." This suggests that a third of
the respondents had not heard of or were not familiar with this particular
technique.231 The response rate to Question 33 (not reported in a table)
supports this assertion: about two-thirds of the departments reported that
"most" or "some" officers had training in the "Reid method." Three
respondents noted in writing that their departments used only Reid training,
making a comparison with other methods impossible or unlikely.
232
Nevertheless, slightly over half the respondents agreed that the "Reid"
method was the best available, attesting to the prominence of that approach
in police interrogation circles. Because much of police training is
proprietary, it is unlikely that evaluative research by detached social
scientists will be possible.233 Further research at the police department level
in relating the styles of interrogation to the modes of training may be useful
to police administrators.
D. ELECTRONIC RECORDING OF INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS
The videotaping of confessions and of entire interrogation sessions has
been initiated in many police departments and appears to be a practice that
227 John E. Reid & Associates, Inc., http://www.reid.com/training-programs/
r_interview.html (last visited May 7, 2007).
228 INBAU ET AL., supra note 144, at 5 passim.
229 Id. at 209-397 (discussing the nine steps in greater depth).
230 GUDJONSSON, supra note 140, at 7-37; Richard Leo, Miranda's Revenge: Police
Interrogation as a Confidence Game, 30 LAW & SoC'Y REv. 259, at 269passim (1996).
23 1 The response "do not know" was not provided as a choice. See Table 7.
232 Respondents "A," "E," and "H."
233 A similar situation exists as to the unverifiable claims of jury consultants who do not
allow external researchers to evaluate the data upon which some claims of success are made.
See NEIL J. KRESSEL & DORIT F. KRESSEL, STACK AND SWAY: THE NEW SCIENCE OF JURY
CONSULTING 75-78 (2002).
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is being adopted by a progressively larger number of departments. 34 It is a
reform that has a chance of succeeding in substantially modifying police
interrogation practices. As the discussion above noted, several states
mandate the recording of interrogations. Videotaping is favored by those
concerned with reducing false confessions and it appears to have benefited
police in gaining the admission of confessions where adopted.235 The views
of the largest police agencies in regard to the taping of confessions are,
therefore, policy-relevant.
Table 8
Opinion and Practice About Taping Confessions
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Disagree Agree Agree
n (%) n (%) n(%) n (%)
7. Station-house
interrogation of adult
offenders should be 8(8.1) 32(32.3) 43(43.4) 16(16.2)
videotaped.
8. Station-house




Always Cases Occasionally Never
n(%) n(%) n(%) n(%)
35. In my
Department, station
house interrogation is 11 (11.7) 39(41.5) 27(28.7) 17(18.1)
videotaped.
36. In my
Department, station 27 (29.0) 37(39.8) 21 (22.6) 8 (8.6)
house interrogation is
audiotaped.
Table 8 shows that while there is majority support for videotaping
among the largest police agencies, this support is far from overwhelming.
Two-fifths of the top administrators of large police departments (40.4%)
oppose stationhouse videotaping, and these levels of support and resistance
are the same for the questioning of both adult and juvenile offenders. As
234 See discussion supra Part II.D.
235 SULLIVAN, POLICE EXPERIENCES, supra note 148, at 6-19.
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for practices, Questions 35 and 36 show that audiotaping stationhouse
interrogation is more frequent than videotaping and that both practices
occur with some frequency. On its face, these results are encouraging to
taping supporters, but, as studies such as Sullivan's show, the devil is in the
details.236 Further research on videotaping at the departmental level could
shed light on whether the entire interrogation is taped (or whether only the
confession is taped), whether taping is mandatory or used only in selected
cases, precisely how the taping and interrogation of juveniles is conducted,
and whether taping is closely monitored by a department's administrators.
E. CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS ON INTERROGATION
Four questions in Table 9 (Questions 16, 31, 32, 34) asked about a
variety of controls on interrogation practices, including lawsuits,
department discipline, and court-ordered injunctions. The high level of
agreement with Question 16 (most lawsuits are frivolous) was anticipated.
That 15.5% disagreed indicates that a number of police executives believe
that there are real problems in policing, suggesting that reform-minded
chiefs are not opposed to the goals of civil lawsuits against police. The
virtual non-existence of reported cases on civil lawsuits based on Miranda
violations has been previously discussed by one of the authors. 7 In this
light, the response to Question 31 (that 6% of large departments have faced
such suits) shows that such lawsuits do occur but are rare. Although the
percentage of departments that have faced such lawsuits is low, the number
of such suits may be larger if the departments that reported them were
confronted with multiple suits. It also may be the case that Chavez v.
Martinez238 has put an end to any such civil lawsuits. The large percentage
of "don't know" answers to Question 31 suggests that more detailed
qualitative research could shed light on this kind of civil suit. Any
empirical study into civil suits should inquire into the infrequent matter of
suits stemming from interrogation practices. Such a study should also
examine the legal culture of the city or region being studied, as well as the
culture of the police department.
236 Id.
237 Zalman, Paradigm Shift, supra note 56, at 337.
238 538 U.S. 760 (2003).
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Table 9
Controls on Police Interrogation Practices
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Disagree Agree Agree
n(%) n(%) n(%) n(%)
16. Most civil lawsuits against 2(2.1) 13(13.4) 66(68.0) 16(16.5)
police officers are frivolous.
Yes No Don't Know
n(%) n(%) n(%)
31. Has an officer in your
department ever been sued for
failing to give Miranda warnings 6(6.2) 51 (52.6) 40 (41.2)
or for irregularities during the
conduct of an interrogation?
32. Has an officer in your
department ever been disciplined
for failing to give Miranda
warnings or for irregularities 11 (11.2) 46(46.9) 41(41.8)
during the conduct of an
interrogation?
34. Interrogation practice in my
department is limited to some
degree by a court injunction, state 9 (9.4) 87 (90.6)
or municipal oversight, or a U.S.
Department of Justice consent
decree.
Similarly, further inquiry may be more fruitful in regard to internal
discipline. Respondents in half of the departments (46.9%) reported that no
officer has ever been disciplined for Miranda irregularities, and only 11.2%
reported that such discipline was ever imposed (Question 32). The large
proportion of respondents who did not know (42%) suggests that this
information is not usually at the fingertips of police executives.23 9
We also inquired into whether the department was operating under a
consent decree into its practices (Question 34). A surprisingly large
number-nine-reported that they were. Research into pattern and practice
lawsuits are silent on whether such suits, and the consent decrees that result,
239 Research into police discipline could compare the frequency of discipline for
interrogation issues to other issues, compare the discipline of detectives and uniformed
officers, and explore whether the anticipated infrequency of discipline for interrogation
issues is due to a lack of concern or because interrogations are generally conducted in a
proper manner. The latter conclusion may be a result of the frequency and level of oversight
of interrogations by managerial officers who monitor confessions as they occur.
MARVIN ZALMAN & BRAD W. SMITH
involve the issue of interrogation practices. 240  Further research into
interrogation practices should take the existence of departmental monitoring
into account as well as other contextual matters. It is possible that the
existence of a consent decree and the presence of a federally appointed
monitor may positively affect a department's law compliance in general.
V. CONCLUSIONS
A. CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS STUDY
This study provides baseline opinion data of big city police
administrators concerning important contemporary issues having to do with
interrogation and confessions. It sheds light on the level of information
held by police administrators about confessions law and provides first-time
data on lawsuits and administrative controls surrounding interrogation
methods. The survey provides information about three controversial issues:
interrogation practices that can subvert Miranda, methods that may induce
false confessions, and videotaping interrogations.
Survey research provides only one approach to gaining knowledge of
the complex subject of our research. The results of this study should be
read in light of observational research and the research based on
interrogation transcripts and reported cases discussed above in Section II.
An ideal study with greater resources would supplement surveys with
observations of interrogation practices and with in-depth interviews of
respondents. Our research, nevertheless, points the way toward further
research.
The general level of compliance with Miranda shown by our survey
supports earlier research.241  Comparison of the national sample with the
Virginia chiefs, 242 most of whose departments are smaller than those in the
national sample, suggests that support for Miranda is positively correlated
with the size of police departments. Responses suggest that most support
for Miranda is pragmatic, with a small percentage of respondents appearing
to have ideological views in opposition to or in support of Miranda.43 The
pragmatic agreement with Miranda is in accord with the well-supported
240 See Samuel Walker, The New Paradigm of Police Accountability: The U.S. Justice
Department "Pattern or Practice" Suits in Context, 22 ST. Louis U. Pun. L. REv. 3 (2003)
[hereinafter Walker, Pattern].
241 See Cassell & Hayman, supra note 17; Leo, Interrogation Room, supra note 70;
Thomas, III, supra note 73.
242 Compare supra Tables I and 2, with Time & Payne, Chiefs' Perceptions, supra note
110, at 81.
243 See supra Table 1, Question 12.
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conclusion that the police have adapted to Miranda.244 Viewing adaptation
and compliance through a broad lens, we conclude that the relationship
between the Supreme Court and the police is one of mutual effects.
Looking only at police interrogation behaviors, the conclusion can be drawn
that police have complied more with the letter than with the spirit of
Miranda, and that to a small degree non-compliant behavior exists. A
wider focus includes four decades of the Supreme Court reworking the
Miranda doctrine, especially through Miranda exceptionalism. 245 It also
includes such responsive police policies and practices as interrogation
"outside Miranda" and the "Missouri two-step" procedure explored in
Missouri v. Seibert,2 46 the implementation of which tends to undermine
Miranda's integrity. This suggests that a complex kind of signaling game
exists, perhaps one that operates on an unconscious level, but one in which
the Supreme Court also responds sub silencio in its formally magisterial
rulings to what it believes the police actually do.247
That a majority of big city police executives agreed with the Supreme
Court majorities in Patane and Seibert, and that police support was stronger
for the less controversial decision of Patane,248 supports the conclusion that
support for Miranda is largely pragmatic, bolstered by an underlying sense
of legality. We call this mood pragmatic legalism. This result also tends to
show that the pragmatism that has marked the decisions of the centrist
justices in the late Rehnquist Court seems to have correctly gauged the
mood of police executives, an important group of law implementers. This
mood of pragmatic legalism is further supported by the respondents'
rejection of Miranda-minimization and interrogation "outside Miranda.249
These responses tap into an ethical behavior dimension in which the
responses on the whole show disapproval of openly flouting the law. In
partial contrast, the respondents show a lesser level of disapproval for
reaping the benefits of interrogation "outside Miranda.25°  These
contrasting responses suggest tension between a desire to cleanly follow the
Supreme Court's rules and a temptation to reap the benefits of shortcutting
those rules.
244 Leo & White, Adapting to Miranda, supra note 12.
245 See supra Part I.B; Schulhofer, supra note 40; Standen, supra note 34.
246 542 U.S. 600 (2004).
247 WASBY, IMPACT, supra note 79, at 30; see also William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P.
Frickey, The Supreme Court 1993 Term-Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L.
REV. 26 (1994) (signaling between Congress and the Supreme Court).
248 See supra Table 1, Questions 13 and 14.
249 See supra Table 4, Question 15.
250 See supra Table 4, Questions 19 and 20.
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Only half of the respondents had heard about Chavez v. Martinez2 5 1 a
year after it was decided. 52 We surmise that the reactions of most big city
police executives to the Supreme Court are based on a generalized
understanding of its cases, with a focus on the practical effects of rulings. It
is unlikely that more than a few high level executives, other than police
legal advisors, carefully study recent cases and their doctrinal
underpinnings. Such study is the business of law professors and some
practicing lawyers and judges, and, within police departments, it tends to be
relegated to specialists. Additional research focusing on the
implementation of Supreme Court decisions should explore the speed and
level of transmission of information about case decisions.253
The present research explores the general impact of the Miranda
doctrine as a foundation for studying the policy questions about
interrogation that are currently on the agendas of courts and police
agencies: the prevalence and legitimacy of interrogation "outside Miranda,"
the prevalence and concern about false confessions, the extent to which
police utilize and favor the electronic recording of interrogations, and the
degree to which interrogation practices are subject to legal and
administrative sanctions and controls.
We have seen in response to attitude questions that a majority of police
executives are not in favor of interrogation "outside Miranda." When asked
about their knowledge in 2004, slightly more than half had heard of the
practice, at least by the label that we used to identify it. 254 This knowledge
was not more prevalent in the western part of the United States, as we had
expected, but knowledge of this practice was higher than average in
California, the state that generated the most prominent judicial cases.255
Only a tiny proportion of departments had written or unwritten policies
concerning the practice, and, as suggested by Weisselberg,256 a number had
251 538 U.S. 760 (2003).
252 See supra Table 5, Question 22.
253 In this regard, Wasby's study on the communication of Supreme Court decisions to
small town police is valuable, but probably made obsolete by police administrators' higher
educational levels today and by the ready availability of Supreme Court opinions and case
commentaries on the internet. WASBY, SMALL TOWN POLICE, supra note 81. Weisselberg's
study comprehensively examined California police training materials regarding interrogation
"outside Miranda" following the Dickerson decision, underscoring an implicit point in court
impact communications theories: decisions can influence officers' conduct only if they are
transmitted to them. Weisselberg, In the Stationhouse, supra note 95, at 1148-51.
Weisselberg, however, did not conduct an empirical study of individual officers' knowledge.
Id.
254 See supra Table 5, Questions 23, and 27-30.
255 See supra Table 6.
256 Weisselberg, In the Stationhouse, supra note 95, at 1148-51.
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terminated or discouraged it.257 These data, when examined as a whole,
show that information about practices that deliberately flout Miranda was
far from universally known, that such practices were not wildly popular,
and that only a small number of departments were extremely concerned
with them. We expressed reservations about Professor Thomas's
characterization of the Supreme Court's prophylactic theory or collateral
use cases as mere "Burger and Rehnquist Court 'wrinkles' in the Miranda
doctrine., 258 We also expressed reservations about the interrogation
methods disclosed in Seibert because they may be the tip of an iceberg of
widespread police evasion of Miranda's requirements. Still, our results
tend to support Professor Thomas's finding that interrogation "outside
Miranda" does not occupy the bulk of appellate cases.259 We conclude that
interrogation "outside Miranda" is not a top priority among police
executives.
The issue of false confessions is a major concern among those
studying wrongful convictions. Three-quarters of police executives deny
that "interrogation techniques sometimes help to produce false
confessions," and a majority support the kind of questioning and the
training method that experts claim are the basis of some false
confessions.260  These data suggest that reforms aimed at changing the
nature of interrogation techniques at the departmental level will meet with
dogged resistance. Recent research suggests that reforms may be most
needed in regard to the interrogation of juvenile and mentally challenged
suspects. 261  Clearly, more research should be conducted-perhaps
combining survey, interview, and observational methods-to get a better
picture of attitudes and practices concerning these issues. A strategy to
educate police leaders about such research findings has been suggested, 62
as well as more fine-grained thinking about how to modify the so-called
"Reid method" without undermining the effectiveness of interrogations.
263
257 See supra Table 5, Questions 27-30.
258 Thomas, III, supra note 73, at 1998.
259 Id.
260 See supra Table 7, Question 11.
261 Blair, supra note 141, at 138.
262 Drizin & Leo, supra note 4, at 100 1-05.
263 Such questions may be a subset of the issues of police pressures, organizational
structure, and tunnel vision that combine to cause a number of wrongful convictions. See
William S. Lofquist, Whodunit? An Examination of the Production of Wrongful
Convictions, in WRONGLY CONVICTED: PERSPECTIVES ON FAILED JUSTICE 174 (Saundra D.
Westervelt & John A. Humphrey, eds., 2001); Dianne L. Martin, The Police Role in
Wrongful Convictions: An International Comparative Study, in WRONGLY CONVICTED:
PERSPECTIVES ON FAILED JUSTICE 77 (Saundra D. Westervelt & John A. Humphrey, eds.,
2001); Dianne L. Martin, Lessons About Justice from the "Laboratory" of Wrongful
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Proponents of videotaping interrogations claim that the police become
strong supporters once they use this method.264 If so, this message has not
entirely penetrated the consciousness of big city police executives. A
majority of the respondents (three-fifths) gave support to videotaping, but
of the total, only one-sixth strongly supported videotaping. 65 Contrary to
expectations, the respondents were not more strongly in favor of
videotaping the interrogation of juveniles. One-sixth reported that
stationhouse interrogations are never videotaped in their departments, while
slightly more than 10% of the departments always videotape.266 Our results
suggest that for whatever reason-cost, storage issues, inertia, or a desire to
avoid exposure in occasional cases of false confessions-support for
videotaping exists but is not overwhelming. This outcome suggests that the
uniform and universal videotaping of interrogations may not be achieved in
the very near future, and that achieving this reform will require substantial
efforts by its proponents.
Finally, our research into policy issues surrounding interrogation led to
questions about lawsuits and other controls. As expected, most
administrators felt that most civil lawsuits against police are frivolous, and
only six reported that an officer in their department was ever sued for
interrogation issues.267 We also discovered that a higher proportion of
departments than expected (9%) were under court order.2 68 This matter was
not explored with follow-up questions, but we suspect that interrogation
issues were not the basis of any of the court orders. If there are problems
with interrogation practices, legal remedies are, in our estimation, an
unpromising avenue of redress. Eleven percent of the respondents indicated
that at least one officer had at least once been disciplined "for failing to give
Miranda warnings or for irregularities during the conduct of an
interrogation.,,269 Thus, internal monitoring and discipline are likely to be
more fruitful avenues for ensuring proper standards. Recall that two-thirds
of the respondents agreed that the views of the chief "have a major impact
270
on law compliance" in the department. It appears that the administrators
Convictions: Tunnel Vision, the Construction of Guilt and Informer Evidence, 70 UMKC L.
REV. 847 (2002). Zalman has proposed that prior to conducting a full interrogation, police
should document the basis of their suspicion against the suspect in writing. Zalman, Tea
Leaves, supra note 56, at 264-66.
264 SULLIVAN, POLICE EXPERIENCES, supra note 148, at 6-7.
265 See supra Table 8, Question 7.
266 See supra Table 8.
267 See supra Table 9, Questions 16, 31.
268 See supra Table 9, Question 34.
269 See supra Table 9, Question 32.
270 See supra Table 3, Question 21.
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of large police departments support the idea that leadership and internal
administrative mechanisms are instrumental to Miranda compliance.
Further research could compare the views of police administrators and
managers with those of line officers and detectives in regard to whether the
policies of the chief are critical to ensuring compliance with legal norms in
general and with interrogation practices in particular.
B. THE "GAP PROBLEM" AND THE RULE OF LAW
Gaps between the law as written and the law as applied, especially in
criminal procedure, go to the heart of constitutional government, based as it
is on the "rule of law," a complex of values and institutions that include
practices by which law and regularized procedures limit the government
and allow it to operate.271 In criminal law and its administration, where
issues of legality272 are of greatest importance to state security and
individual liberties, the rule of law primarily and unambiguously means "a
definite limitation on the power of the State. 273  Achieving this
desideratum, however, is not a simple matter. As Lon Fuller explains in his
classic exposition of the eight elements of legality (or what he calls the
"inner morality of law"), the "utopia" of perfection in legality ought to be
seen more in aspirational terms than in a set of absolutely measurable
criteria.274 The failures of some elements of legality do not indicate a
complete breakdown in the rule of law. Indeed, any empirical impact study
is likely to show some level of non-compliance with legal and constitutional
restrictions by the police. Therefore, a mature understanding of the rule of
law should distinguish between, on the one hand, the inevitable and
possibly useful exercises of discretion,275 as well as unavoidable lapses by
the police, and on the other, regimes in which the police ignore the courts
271 The scope of rule of law scholarship is vast. See, e.g., THE RULE OF LAW: NoMos
XXXVI (Ian Shapiro ed., 1994); ALLEN, supra note 105.
272 The principal of legality is, strictly speaking, a component of the rule of law, which is
centered on the idea that penal laws must be written and non-retroactive and must be
interpreted as placing definite limits on the power of the state to penalize individuals. See
ALLEN, supra note 105 (the rule of law in criminal justice can be undermined by institutional
and structural factors); JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 27-69 (2d ed.
1960) (1947).
273 HALL, supra note 272, at 27.
274 LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 44-46 (rev. ed. 1969) (1964). The eight criteria
are the existence of law, its publication, non-retroactivity, understandable rules, non-
contradictory rules, rules that can be followed, stability in the law, and "congruence between
the rules as announced and their actual administration." Id. at 39.
275 Goldstein, supra note 170, at 554-62.
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with impunity. 6 The level of "slippage" in officials' obedience to legal
and constitutional norms is, however, a matter for concern, even if the
reasons for the "gap" are mundane.
The "gap problem" as an indicator of a potential failure of the rule of
law is not simply a practical failure to reach a complex and hard-to-
measure, universally agreed-upon goal. The gap between Miranda's
strictures and police behavior as a measure of legitimacy is interpreted
differently by different groups; it may carry different overtones for
conservatives and liberals, lawyers and police, or different demographic
segments of the population. Such variations reflect the different weights
placed on the necessary categories of order and liberty by adherents to the
due process model and crime control model.277 Lon Fuller, explaining why
law has some substantive and ethical grip and is not simply a verbal conduit
for state power, describes law as "the enterprise of subjecting human
conduct to the governance of rules. 2 78 However, to assess whether police
and judges are speaking the same language when talking about law and
rules, to say nothing of the rule of law, we should consider Shklar's insight
that for lawyers, law is not simply a tool, but the foundation of their
ideology: legalism. Legalism "is the ethical attitude that holds moral
conduct to be a matter of rule following, and moral relationships to consist
of duties and rights determined by rules. 279
Law, at least in Western societies, is a universally shared and well-
understood (if contested) underlying element of government, social
interaction, and political thought. But viewing law as "legalism," the
special political ideology of the legal profession, helps to explain societal
reactions to police behavior that does not always adhere to rules announced
by the Supreme Court to guide their behavior. For, as Shklar notes, "the
spirit of legalism is not now, and never has been, the only morality among
276 The latter is a hallmark of the complete absence of the rule of law associated with
despotic regimes. For a specific example, see, e.g., INGO MOLLER, HITLER'S JUSTICE: THE
COURTS OF THE THIRD REICH 174-76 (Deborah Lucas Schneider trans., 1991).
277 PACKER, supra note 29, at 154-73. A succinct example of the different political and
legal views that may be encompassed under the "rule of law" is nicely phrased by Judith
Shklar, who placed the highest value on democratic politics and toleration in her "barebones
liberalism." She noted,
My view of legalism is overtly liberal, but it is not the liberalism of the "rule of law" ideal
promulgated by Friedrich von Hayek and his followers, because it does not suggest that the only
function of a legal system is to provide a secure framework for the spontaneous order of the free
market.
JUDITH N. SHKLAR, LEGALISM: LAW, MORALS, AND POLITICAL TRIALS xi (1986).
278 FULLER, supra note 274, at 96.
279 SHKLAR, supra note 277, at 1.
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men even in generally legalistic societies.,, 280 The theme of her book, a
defense of the legitimacy of the Nuremberg war trial, is relevant to our
conclusion. The prosecution of crimes against humanity by the Allies was
challenged by the legalistic objection that there was no preexisting statute,
treaty, or super-national law-making body that did or could positively
outlaw the factually-established past horrors of the Nazi regime: "For a
lawyer this circumstance creates a great difficulty, given his tendency to
think in either-or terms of law or non-law., 281 Shklar's defense of the trial
rested on a more complex vision: "The main point here is to show that it is
practically of great importance to see legalism as a matter of degree, to
recognize that there are lawlike political institutions and legalistic politics
which are not just 'illegal,' but rather form a continuum consisting of
degrees of legalism.' 282
To a person who holds to a "fundamentalist" vision of law, such an
interpretation of law is risky business, a slippery slope to totalitarianism. A
more realistic view is that a mature and ethical legal system in an advanced
society operates though the casuistic interpretation of texts and that a
slavish adherence to the letter of the law or to each element of legality does
not necessarily mean the end of constitutional government. Again, this
view intends not to excuse "gaps" or to suggest that they be ignored but to
attempt to put them in a proper context.
The apparent agreement of Fuller and Shklar, therefore, does not mean
that lapses by criminal justice personnel in following the dictates of the
Supreme Court are a matter of no consequence, as "infringements of legal
morality tend to become cumulative."2 83 Therefore, practical efforts to
achieve the rule of law to the greatest extent feasible, if not to attain it in
some absolute sense, may be viewed as a requirement of legality. Under
this view, policymakers, judges, and administrators who perceive apparent
shortfalls in compliance with law (or "congruence," in Fuller's terms) have
an obligation to monitor, to evaluate, and to act on lapses.284 With this said,
we conclude by examining two aspects of the relationship between the
Supreme Court and the police regarding compliance with the Miranda
doctrine.
Some lapses on the part of the police may, with some justice, be
attributable to failures by the law-maker; that is, the Supreme Court.
280 Id. at 2.
281 Id. at 157.
282 Id. at 156 (emphasis added).
283 FULLER, supra note 274, at 92.
284 Action, in a policy sense, includes the failure to act, which may be justified depending
upon the circumstances.
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Several elements of Fuller's analysis of legality are especially pertinent to
the communications theory of legal compliance: that law be clear, be non-
contradictory, and be relatively unchanging.285 With some justification, it
can be seen that well-meaning police officers do not have an easy task in
following all of the Court's doctrinal gyrations and may, because of this
286difficulty, fail to comply with the Court's norms. Indeed, as Professor
Albert Alschuler noted in commenting on the work of the Supreme Court,
"No one really knows what Miranda means." 287 The Miranda warnings
themselves are clear enough, and the data from this and other studies show
that formal compliance with reading Miranda warnings is high. However,
in other respects, some of the Court's decisions have injected levels of
uncertainty into the law. The prophylactic cases, allowing the collateral use
of statements obtained in violation of Miranda rules, virtually invited the
police to expand these categories by intentional violations.2 88 It is worth
noting, however, that there appeared to be no wholesale rush by police in
the 1970s and 1980s to push the limits of interrogation practices to what is
now called interrogation "outside Miranda." It took the work of legal
advisors, carefully distilling the implications of the prophylactic cases, to
begin to teach in the 1990s that interrogation "outside Miranda" was
proper. The California training materials reproduced by Weisselberg
289
have a defensive tone, and one can infer the unease of police who were
being told that they were on solid footing by continuing to question a
suspect after the invocation of rights, when the Miranda decision itself said
that questioning must cease.
The Supreme Court's process of incremental doctrinal development,
however essential to its legitimacy and the legitimacy of its products, has
produced some inconsistent if not incoherent results. As the composition of
the Supreme Court has shifted away from persons who previously played
major and varied roles in law practice and public life into a sort of legal
285 FULLER, supra note 274, at 63-70, 79-81.
286 The late Richard Uviller, with great care, revealed the views of police officers that he
followed in their work for a year. On the basis of common sense they sharply opposed, but
would follow, state law that barred the use of a "cured" statement that would be admissible
under Oregon v. Elstad, but at least one officer could not fathom the legality of a rule that
allowed police to lie to suspects during interrogation. H. RICHARD UVILLER, TEMPERED
ZEAL: A COLUMBIA LAW PROFESSOR'S YEAR ON THE STREETS WITH THE NEW YORK CITY
POLICE 198-212 (1988).
287 Albert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in Historical Perspective: The Right to
Remain Silent, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2625, 2629 (1996).
288 See Note, Laws That Are Meant To Be Broken: Adjusting for Anticipated
Noncompliance, 75 MICH. L. REV. 687, at 687-88 passim (1977) (arguing that legislatures
expect levels of noncompliance with some laws).
289 Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, supra note 3, at 189-92.
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mandarinate, the justices spend considerable energy on smaller numbers of
cases than in past years by searching for the most precise expressions of the
reasons for their decisions. This method results in finely honed decisions
that can leave scholars in confusion and, perversely, are often of little
290 291assistance to implementers. In Chavez v. Martinez, for example, the
Court promulgated three divergent views about the meaning of the Fifth
Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination, with the plurality saying
quite bluntly that torture does not violate the privilege, a position that no
police department would follow. As the case was ultimately to be decided
on due process grounds, the police will have to exercise judgment in an
uncertain milieu when interrogating a person under the kind of stressful
circumstances that existed in Chavez.
In Seibert, the police in Rolla, Missouri who applied the two-step
procedure were following the advice of lawyers hired to guide them in the
proper understanding of the Supreme Court's rulings.292  Even the
dissenters in Seibert distanced themselves from the actions taken by the
police in that case by noting that Ms. Seibert's statement should be
suppressed if involuntary, a matter to be determined on remand by the
Missouri courts.2 93 Justice O'Connor, like a schoolmarm gently castigating
a wayward pupil, noted that "unlike the officers in Elstad, Officer Hanrahan
referred to Seibert's unwarned statement during the second part of the
interrogation when she made a statement at odds with her unwarned
confession. 294 Poor Officer Hanrahan: having been told how to do his job,
he did it very well indeed, only to be called out, by name, by the highest
court in the land for not having precisely assimilated the facts of one of the
more than sixty post-Miranda opinions issued by the United States
Supreme Court. Thus, threats to the rule of law may originate with a lack
of clarity in Miranda rules as announced by the Court or in the rapid shifts
in its Miranda doctrine cases and not with the actions of the police who
follow their lead.
Another major threat to the rule of law, according to Fuller, is a lack of
congruence between the law as written and the law as applied.295 In
keeping with Fuller's caution not to see the demise of the rule of law in
every divergence from strict legality, consider the various reasons for
290 Stuart Taylor, Jr., Comment: Remote Control, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Sept. 2005, at 37;
Benjamin Wittes, Comment: Without Precedent, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Sept. 2005, at 39.
291 538 U.S. 760 (2003).
292 Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 609-10 (2004).
293 Id. at 628 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
294 Id. at 628-29.
295 FULLER, supra note 274, at 81-91.
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failures of congruence. It "may be destroyed or impaired in a great variety
of ways: mistaken interpretation, inaccessibility of the law, lack of insight
into what is required to maintain the integrity of a legal system, bribery,
prejudice, indifference, stupidity, and the drive toward personal power., 296
These are the kinds of failings that a robust constitutional system can
absorb, so long as courts and other political leaders do not become
complacent but instead act to correct failures of justice arising from such
mundane reasons. It is police administrators who should be at the forefront
of such efforts. Placing them in this role is not fanciful. Our study and
others suggest that while modem, educated police administrators are not
ideologues of legalism (in Shklar's terms), they exhibit a kind of
"pragmatic legalism" that is a hallmark of professional policing in the era of
educated, managerial police executives implementing up-to-date programs
of problem-oriented policing, community policing, and many other
complex tasks.297 Since it can be assumed that mundane reasons for the
failure of law compliance are a constant in police departments, the existence
of such factors calls for more detailed knowledge about how the law is
applied in practice. This application should not be the concern only of
sporadic academic research endeavors; it ought to be institutionalized in
departmental practice audits by police managers. Armed with knowledge
of the gap between the law as written and the law as practiced in their own
departments, police leaders who view fidelity to law as a component of
professional police leadership will have the information base with which to
ensure greater compliance with law.298
How comfortable should citizens be with the results of our survey with
regard to the rule of law? It may be useful to think of legality in terms of
the wholesale and the retail dispensation of policing and justice. At the
wholesale level, the survey results show that the practical and well-educated
men and women who are in charge of the largest police departments in the
country support the continuation of Miranda and are not comfortable with
flagrant deviations from its most prominent rules. These results reflect the
pragmatic legalism of present-day big city police administrators. About
half of the respondents knew of a Supreme Court ruling on confessions
(Chavez, decided a year before the survey). This finding suggests that
executives in charge of major police departments are not on top of every
296 Id. at 81.
297 See, e.g., RONALD GLENSOR, KENNETH J. PEAK & LARRY K. GAINES, POLICE
SUPERVISION (1999); ELI B. SILVERMAN, NYPD BATTLES CRIME: INNOVATIVE STRATEGIES IN
POLICING (1999).
298 Law-abiding policing has become a global concern, along with recognition of human
rights. See DEMOCRATIC POLICING AND ACCOUNTABILITY: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES (Errol P.
Mendes et al. eds., 1999).
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new wrinkle in Miranda law, a matter that is hardly a threat to the rule of
law. We surmise that knowledge of Supreme Court rulings is one of many
things a busy chief must be aware of, lest the implications of a ruling come
to impinge on the department's functioning.
The police executives were skeptical about interrogation methods
being a cause of false confessions, but over half supported videotaping. A
small percentage indicated that their departments had some level of internal
discipline devoted to sanctioning improper interrogation methods. A strict
legalist may be alarmed by these findings and see in the large minority who
oppose videotaping, for example, a desire to hide potentially illegal or
unconstitutional police work from the scrutiny of the public. At the
wholesale level, we believe that such a critical reading of the results of this
study would be alarmist and uncalled for. As Jerome Hall, the noted
twentieth-century legal philosopher, observed, legalism depends not only
on strict compliance with rules but also on "supporting institutions,
procedures, and values., 299 Francis Allen elaborated the point:
The rule of law is only one of the devices to direct and contain the powers of public
officials, available to a political society valuing individual autonomy. The mores and
morals of the community, widely held and often unarticulated, are, of course,
fundamental. The ballot box in a democratic society may represent the ultimate
remedy for widespread official disregard of legal norms. The ethics of
professionalism may, on occasion, prevent or moderate excesses of public officers.
30 0
Big city police executives are better educated than ever before, are
recognized as prominent civic leaders, have moved beyond the rigid
separation from politics of the "professional" era, and have learned that an
understanding of community views is necessary to successful policing.30
The United States Department of Justice has imposed "practice and pattern"
decrees on a growing number of departments, as national standards have
developed and as inter-agency cooperation has grown.30 2 Police executives
are increasingly trained in managerial sciences and have come to view law-
abidingness by officers as necessary to run an efficient and effective
organization. All of these factors, combined with our research results,
suggest that habits of legality are well established-at the wholesale level.
At the retail level, however, a disturbing number of case studies and
surveys offer highly detailed accounts of psychological interrogation
299 HALL, supra note 272, at 27.
300 ALLEN, supra note 105, at 19.
301 SAMUEL WALKER, POPULAR JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE
131-34, 170-74, 197-201, 232-39 (2d ed. 1998) (1980).
302 Walker, Pattern, supra note 240.
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methods pushing innocent people to confess.3 °3 At the retail level, at least
one "two-step interrogation" in Rolla, Missouri has been closely scrutinized
by the Supreme Court, and it is anyone's guess as to how often suspects are
manipulated to the extent that Patrice Seibert was.304 Without systematic
monitoring and universal videotaping, it is very hard to know in how many
interrogations veiled threats or lavish promises are implied; how many
continue for too many hours; how many create fabrications that exceed the
line of suggestibility; how many are conducted vigorously against
vulnerable populations of teenaged and mentally challenged suspects; or
how many are based on weak facts and tunnel vision. Our data suggest that
a small fraction of large police departments, perhaps 10%, has actively
considered interrogation "outside Miranda" to the point of having explicit
policies.30 5 This wholesale finding, again, does not provide data on the
actual cases of abuse of the interrogation process. The kind of wholesale
violations of legality that define despotic governments are rare in
democratic regimes, typically occurring in times of crisis and social
panics.3 °6 In routine law enforcement in democratic regimes, behavior that
degrades the habits of legality tends to occur in the retail dispensation of
303 It is useful to compare our findings to empirical studies of jury selection and criminal
sentencing that show that race has an effect at the individual level but that the race effect is
cancelled out at the institutional level. See, e.g., David C. Baldus et al., The Use of
Peremptory Challenges in Capital Murder Trials: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 3 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 3, 53 (2001); Travis C. Pratt, Race and Sentencing: A Meta-Analysis of
Conflicting Empirical Research Results, 26 J. CRIM. JUST. 513, 519 (1998) ("At the
individual level of analysis, evidence of racial discrimination in sentencing is more likely to
be found, yet at the institutional level, anti-African American, pro-African American and
nondiscriminatory judicial decisions may cancel each other out resulting in a statistical
finding of no discrimination."); Mary R. Rose, The Peremptory Challenge Accused of Race
or Gender Discrimination? Some Data from One County, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 695,
698-99 (1999); Billy M. Turner et al., Race and Peremptory Challenges During Voir Dire:
Do Prosecution and Defense Agree?, 14 J. CRIM. JUST. 61, 64-67 (1986).
Such studies can only be suggestive of the retail and wholesale effects suggested herein.
They do, however, alert us to the possibility that a number, and perhaps a fairly large
number, of legal violations that occur in such criminal justice processes as interrogation
become "invisible" because they are not recorded and because they are not so widespread as
to come to public attention through the news media.
304 Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004).
305 See supra Table 7.
306 See NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIVIL DISORDERS (KERNER COMM'N), REPORT
(1968). An egregious example of a continuous pattern of gross abuses in interrogation
amounting to torture has been documented in one Chicago precinct. JOHN CONROY,
UNSPEAKABLE ACTS, ORDINARY PEOPLE: THE DYNAMICS OF TORTURE 21-26, 60-87, 158-68,
225-41 (2000) (systematic torture of criminal suspects in the Area 2 precinct in Chicago for
thirteen years from the late 1970s to the early 1990s); Susan Bandes, Patterns of Injustice:
Police Brutality in the Courts, 47 BUFFALO L. REV. 1275 (1999) (same).
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criminal justice. A society that values the rule of law in practice, not just
with lip service, ought to take pains to ensure practices to the degree
practicable to avoid violations of legality. In the context of interrogation,
the external evidence suggests that sufficient problems exist in interrogation
practices to warrant some greater levels of checking.
30 7
The results of our survey also indicate that police administrators are
sufficiently attuned to the concerns of proper and lawful procedures to want
to follow the law. Our survey supports the understanding that legal controls
are an inefficient and less-than-effective way of ensuring that police comply
with constitutional rulings. Despite their skepticism about the link between
interrogation methods and false confessions, the majority of large city
police administrators support the videotaping of confessions. The
environment of legality in regard to interrogations would be improved at
least by the introduction of the routine videotaping of interrogations in
departments that do not currently employ the practice. It would be
immeasurably strengthened if police executives devoted greater attention to
the conditions of legality within their own departments, although the
Supreme Court could assist well-meaning police chiefs by taking the
constitutional rights of citizens more seriously.
C. WHITHER MIRANDA?
After forty years of existence, the Miranda doctrine has reached
middle age. It was conceived by Justices who were young lawyers in the
heyday of police third-degree practices. Appalled by these practices, the
Supreme Court began to challenge coercive interrogation practices in the
mid-1930s by excluding confessions under the due process voluntariness
test. Three decades of voluntariness test decisions left the Court frustrated
by the continuation of coercive police interrogations. Although the level of
brutality in the back rooms of police stations was abating by the mid-1960s,
social tolerance for police brutality was simultaneously declining and the
Supreme Court was demanding more refined police behavior in its
voluntariness cases.
Miranda was born to great liberal hope of ending coercive
interrogations and strident conservative protest that its warnings approach
would drastically undermine public safety. The liberal Court that created
Miranda did not last long enough to develop supporting rules that might
have resulted in less psychologically pressuring interrogations. The
conservative Court holding sway since 1972 has not been able to eliminate
307 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1969)
(finding unwarranted discretion in agencies controlled by the methods of confining,
structuring, and checking).
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Miranda, although it has doctrinally weakened it in many respects. Several
ironies surround the Miranda doctrine's life course.308 The very Court that
created the loopholes in and exceptions to Miranda, which seemingly set it
up for being overruled, was the Court that rescued it in Dickerson.30 9 Even
while the Miranda doctrine is filled with exceptions that allow the use of
tainted confessions for a number of purposes, the Court nevertheless insists
on mandatory warnings in every police custodial interrogation.
A greater irony exists. On the one hand, Miranda is so doctrinally
confused that legal scholars have difficulty seeing how it can continue to
exist with any semblance of coherence. Yet on the other hand, as our
survey results bear out, many police administrators have come to embrace it
as a standard of professionalism and right conduct, and are scrupulous in
applying the letter of Miranda. Nevertheless, in practice, police often
administer Miranda in ways that do not convey to suspects the full meaning
of their constitutional privilege to remain silent. Making sense of these
seemingly incompatible perspectives requires that we look at Miranda in a
different way.
When Richard Leo "revisited" the impact of Miranda, he speculated
that Miranda accelerated the trend toward less physically violent police
interrogation, forced police to develop more professional postures during
interrogation, and made legality an essential measure of police work.310
The challenge of Miranda forced or "inspired police to develop more
specialized, more sophisticated, and seemingly more effective interrogation
techniques with which to elicit inculpatory statements from custodial
suspects.",31 On a broader social tableau, Miranda's notoriety "increased
public awareness of constitutional rights, 31 2 an insight that was echoed in
Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in Dickerson313 and that played
a role in keeping the Court from overruling Miranda.
At the present time, exciting questions about interrogations, driven by
34the actual-innocence movement, 14 have more to do with research on
308 In Anglo-American law, legal doctrines, whether they are common law doctrines or
doctrines of statutory or constitutional interpretation, may go through cycles of birth, growth,
application, decline, and even death. See LEVI, supra note 75, at 8-9 passim.
309 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
310 Richard A. Leo, The Impact of Miranda Revisited, 86. J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
621, 668-71 (1996).
311 Id. at 672.
312 Id. at 671.
313 "Miranda has become embedded in routine police practice to the point where the
warnings have become part of our national culture." Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 443.
314 See, e.g., Marvin Zalman, Cautionary Notes on Commission Recommendations: A
Public Policy Approach to Wrongful Convictions, 41 CRIM. L. BULL. 169 (2005).
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interrogation practices than with refinements of Miranda doctrine. The
movement to videotape interrogations, 31 5 to take the age and mental status
316of suspects into account, to establish a factual foundation of suspicion
before interrogating a suspect, 1 7 and similar procedures offer the hope of
reducing false confessions while allowing interrogation practice to continue
more or less in its present mode. This appreciation led Richard Leo to
suggest that "Miranda's impact in the twenty-first century appears rather
limited," and to imply that Miranda has outlived its usefulness. 318 It seems
to us that the Miranda doctrine still plays a necessary role in law
enforcement. The acceptance of Miranda by police, supported by the
results of our survey, shows that although it may not have led police to
behave in accord with the original vision of the case,319 it continues to be
the legal standard on which a law-abiding and restrained approach to
interrogation rests. As we have emphasized earlier in this Conclusion, the
larger purpose of constitutional criminal procedure is to uphold the rule of
law. To be viable, a doctrine must guide practice in fact and hold the
allegiance of those who apply the law. The Miranda doctrine, as presently
structured, appears to be an important value for many of our respondents,
continues to shape interrogation practices, and continues to perform its vital
constitutional function.
315 Sullivan, Recent Developments, supra note 148.
316 Blair, supra note 141.
317 Zalman, Tea Leaves, supra note 56, at 363-66.
318 Leo, Questioning the Relevance, supra note 89, at 1026.
319 Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, supra note 3, at 117-25.
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Appendix
The format of the survey instrument appearing in this Appendix has
been modified by adding question numbers, which did not appear on the
questionnaire that was mailed to respondents, and by indicating in bold
which questions have been taken directly from Time and Payne (2002).
WAYNE STATE UNIVERSITY
DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE July 2004
LAW ENFORCEMENT EXECLTIVES' SURVEY
OF INTERROGATION LAW AND PRACTICES
Thank you for completing this survey. It should take you about 30 minutes.If you have any questions about this survey feel free to contact Marvin Zalman: (313) 577-6087;
an 1887@ewayne.edu.
OPINION QUESTIONS
Strongly Disagree Agree Strongly
disagree agree
V V T V
I In order to prevent the dismissal of a case, anesting
officers must routinely read offenders their Miranda rights. T&P-l . .-
2. Police officers in my depatment routinely read offenders
the Miranda warnings. T&P-2 ............................
3. Courts are too cautious with regard to the Miranda warnings. T&P-4 ..
4. Detectives should read Miranda warnings in a way to make
them seem unimportant ....... .........................-
5. Too many offendem get off easy as a result of Mlranda
warnings. T&P-5 ......................................
6. The Miranda warnings are useful in principle but ineffective in
practice. T&P-7 ......................................
7. Station-house interrogation of adult offenders should be videotuped.
S. Station-house interrogation ofjuvenile offenders should be videotaped. - _ _
9. The requirement to read suspects the Miranda warnings makes
it difficult for police to do their jobs. T&P-12 ......................
10. Mfranda warnings hinder voluntary confessions. T&P-13 ....
I1. Interrogation techniques sometimes help to produce
false confessions ......................................
12. In Drckcrson (2000) the Supreme Court ruled that Miranda is
constitutional. The Supreme Court Khouldha abolished
mandatory Miranda warnings.............................
13. In June 2004 the Supreme Court ruled that a gun is admissible in
evidence if taken after an admission to an officer who did not complete
givingMiranda warnings. There was no public safety issue.
What is your opinion ofthis decision in U.S v. Patane? . . . . . . . . . . . ...
ATTITUDES OF POLICE EXECUTIVES
Strongly Disagree Agree Strongly
disagree agree
14. In June 2004 the Supreme Coun ruled a confession inadmissible if
obtained in a two-stage station house interrogation, where no Miranda
wanings arc given in the fast interrogation, but are given in the second
interrogation. What is your opinion of this decision in Alisourl v.
,% ,lbera, .................................................... _ _ _ _
15. An officer should be permitted to continue in-custodv questioning
after an offender says he does not want to lalk or asks for a lawyer ....
16. Most civil lawsuits against police officers are frivolous.
17. Officers conducting interrogations should he encouraged to be
verbally persistent in order to obtain admissions .................
Ig. The Reid interrogation training method is the best available.
19. A slatemsent taken in violation ol'Ahronda should be used
to impeach an offender's credibility on the witness stand.........
20. A sMatement taken in violation ofAhMranda should he used
to get leads about a case ................................. .
21. The police chiefs views of firanda law have a major impact
on law compliance in hislier police department .....................
QUESTIONS ABOl r INTERROGATION "OUTSIDE MIfND/l"
22. Chore v. Martinez (2003) held that an officer cannot
be held civilly liable for failure to give Miranda warnings.
Have you heard about Chavc: v. Martne: prior to this survey? 0 Yes 0 No
23. Have you heard of a practice known as
interrogation "outside Afiranda" prior to this survey? 0 Yes r3 No
24. If "Yes." about whoat ve did you first hear of this practice?
25. Does your departtent have general written policies
concerning interrogation andMiranda warnings? 0 Yes 0 No
26 If "Yes." 0 Policies are too legalistic and not useful
0 Policies have telpful e"unples
Other: .
27. In the past decade has your Department had a written
22 ja allowing interrogation "outside AMranda"? 0 Yes 0 No
2. If"Yes," was tle policy terminated? 0 Yes 0 No
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29. In the past decade has your Department had an
unwritten Policy alln ing interrogation "outside A1itranda"?
30. If -Yes," is the practice discouraged?
3 1. Has an officer in your depautmcnt ever be.en Ed for
failing to give Miranda warnings or for irregularities
during the conduct of an interrogation?
32, Has an officer in your department ever been diwiplined
for failing to give Miranda warnings or for irregularities
during the conduct of an interrogation?
33. Invesigators'detectives in my departmen have had
interrogation training in the "Reid method,"
34. Interrogation practice in my department is limited to some
degree by a court injunction state or municipal oversight,
or a U.S. Department of Justice consent decree.
35. In my Department, station house interrogation is
36. In my Department, station house interrogation is
QUESTIONS ABOUT PERSON COMPLETING SURVEY
37. Title:
3& Gender: 0 Male 0 Female
39. RaceiEthnicity El African American 0 N11h
O Hispanic IUtino 0 0h
40. Fducational Level: 0 H1igh School 0 Son
0 A.A. or Some College D La,
0 Bachelor's degree 0 Gra
0 Yes 0 No
0 Yes ONo









0 Yes 0 No
o Always videotaped
0 Videotaped in serious cases
0 Occasionally videotaped
o Never videotaped
0 AIways audio taped
o Audio taped in seious cases
o] Occasionally audio taped






o Law and Graduate degree
Ifyou ha e additional comments that you wish to add. please use reverse side.
THANK YOU
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